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INTRODUCTION

One of the most fundamental norms in our judicial system is that courts
need to hear from both parties on a legal issue before granting any form of legal
relief. Nevertheless, rules of civil procedure permit a vulnerable party to appear
in court ex parte (without prior notice to the other party), to obtain a temporary
order prohibiting a wrongful action about to be taken that will cause irreparable
harm. A classic example of this is when a person runs into court because a
demolition crew is starting to set up to demolish a building they have built and
claim to own. Due to the time it would take to provide prior notice of the hearing
for the requested relief to the party responsible for this action, the harm to be
avoided would likely take place. Consequently, in this instance, a court would be
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willing to hold an ex parte hearing to determine whether to grant a temporary
restraining order. 3 This Article focuses on ex parte orders in the context of
domestic violence. It is easy to see the potential imminent harm-to see the
"wrecking ball in motion"-in cases where demolition crews are starting to
demolish buildings, but what happens in domestic violence cases when the court
is unable to see the imminent harm-the "wrecking ball in motion"---or how
giving notice can set-off that wrecking ball into motion?
In the context of domestic violence, ex parte orders of protection are
intended to protect survivors of domestic violence from further acts of abuse,
including violence, when they attempt to safely leave an abusive intimate partner.
This Article explores the critical question of the extent to which judges "see the
wrecking ball in motion" when they make their rulings in this context. We
contend that when judges do not understand the realities of domestic violence, in
particular, the counter-intuitive aspects of domestic violence, or when a victim
acts in a manner against a held gender stereotype, the judges are much less likely
to see the "wrecking ball in motion" and are more likely to deny ex parte orders
of protection that they should be granting.
In Section I, we note the general laws that apply to obtaining ex parte
restraining orders in non-domestic violence cases, the strong norm against ex
parte orders, and consider how these norms may impact how judges rule in ex
parte order of protection cases for survivors of domestic violence.
In Section II, we explore the various statutory standards applied among the
fifty states as conditions for survivors of domestic violence to obtain ex parte
orders of protection. We compare these requirements to the general laws on ex
parte restraining orders and consider the possible reasons for the different
approaches. We also briefly touch upon which of these statutory standards best
address the realities of domestic violence laid out in Section III.
In Section III, we discuss the often counter-intuitive realities of domestic
violence. We analyze how that, gendered stereotypes, and other cognitive
phenomenon can hinder how judges assess the credibility of those who allege
they are "survivors of domestic violence"4 in need of an ex parte order of
3. Randy Wilson, From My Side ofthe Bench: Restraining Orders, THE ADVOCATE, xii
2013 Judge noted this example. Another classic example, is, if a person is in the process of
trying to embezzle money :from various accounts and the injured party seeks to prevent this by
:freezing her/his bank accounts. If you give notice of the intended action, the person trying to
embezzle the money might rush to commit the very act you are trying to prohibit and then flee
the country. This was another example cited by the Judge who explained that once a year he
and the other civil judges hear all the ex parte temporary restraining orders for half a month,
with typical cases relating to foreclosures, covenants not to compete, trade secrets and stopping
a building :from being razed.
4. In this Article, at times, we refer to the intimate partners who engage in abuse to
coercively control a current or former intimate partner as the "Abusive Partner" and refer to
the survivor of this abuse as the "Target of the Abuse" to emphasize the deliberate and coercive
nature of domestic violence and distinguish it :from an anger management problem. We also
refer to survivors of domestic violence with the pronouns "she" and "her" and abusive intimate
partners with the pronouns "he" and "him" based on statistics showing that intimate partner
violence is committed primarily against women. Callie Rennison Ph.D. & Sarah Welchans,
BUREAU OF STATISTICS: SPECIAL REPORT, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE,
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protection. We also analyze how these realities and cognitive phenomenon can
thwart judicial assessment of the likelihood of future abuse.
In Section IV, we focus on cases among the fifty states where the petitioner
has alleged abuse that raises a danger of further abuse and analyze how judges
have interpreted and applied the different statutory standards for an ex parte order
of protection in those cases. We also share the results from a survey of domestic
violence service providers in Chicago, Illinois, on the extent those service
providers observed judges to deny an ex parte order of protection due to a delay
in seeking the order of protection and due to the petitioner failing to state that
he/she "feared" the respondent. We also consider how certain cognitive
phenomena such as uncertainty discounting, gendered stereotyping, following
scripts, and other forms of heuristics may be causing judges in the cases
reviewed, and in the empirical study, to fail to grant orders of protection as they
should in these cases.
In Section V, we propose law reforms to better protect survivors of domestic
violence seeking ex parte orders of protection in light of the realities of domestic
violence and the cognitive heuristics judges use when ruling in these cases. We
also consider in this section the due process rights of those alleged to be abusive
intimate partners, and what is appropriate and fair in light of what is at stake for
each of the parties from an adverse ruling.

I.

PRECONDITIONS FOR AN EXP ARTE ORDER IN NON-DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE CONTEXTS

Before reviewing the statutory standards for an ex parte order of protection
in a domestic violence context, it is illuminating to first review the statutory
preconditions for an ex parte temporary restraining order in other contexts and
how courts have applied those preconditions to the cases before them. The
Digital Generation, Inc. v. Boring5 case provides a good example.
The court in this case first noted that under the federal rules of civil
procedure, in order for a court to issue an ex parte temporary restraining order
(TRO), it must be shown that immediate and irreparable injury will result before

NCJ 178247, (2000). For example, according to the Department of Justice Report, in 1997
7 .5 women per 1,000 experienced intimate partner violence; while only 1.5 men per 1,000
men experienced intimate partner violence. Another example is that while 24% of women
report being a victim of severe physical violence by an intimate partner during her lifetime,
14% of men report being a victim of severe physical violence by an intimate partner during
his lifetime. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION & NATIONAL CENTER FOR INJURY
PREVENTION AND CONTROL, NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY
2010
SUMMARY
REPORT
43-44
(2011),
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs_report20l0-a.pdf. While there is the issue
of possible under-reporting or over-reporting, it is illuminating to note that, according to the
Department of Justice report, three times more women are murdered by an intimate partner
versus men murdered by an intimate partner.
5. Dig. Generation, Inc. v. Boring, Civ. A. No. 3:12-CV-00329-L, 2012 WL 315480
(N.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2012).
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the adverse party can be heard. 6 Digital Generation sought a temporary
restraining order to prevent a former employee from soliciting clients and
releasing confidential information. The company argued that if they provided
notice to the former employee of their petition for a restraining order that the
company would suffer immediate and irreparable harm, based on the release of
the confidential information.
The court declined to issue the TRO for two reasons. First, the company
failed to explain why they thought the employee would take these actions and
how the employment contract was currently violated. Second, the company
waited 45 days to argue for a TRO, so the court concluded that the company did
not perceive an immediate risk. 7
As will be discussed in Sections III and IV infra, judges raise very similar
questions, concerns, and conclusions as described above in order of protection
cases for survivors of domestic violence. They will want to know why the
petitioner thinks that their former intimate partner will take the actions that the
petitioner fears, and, when the petitioner does not appear in court right after
violence or threatened violence has occurred, judges may also conclude it is
"evident" that the petitioner does not perceive an immediate risk necessitating an
ex parte order.
Due to the strong norm against ex parte orders in general and consequential
judicial reluctance to issue such orders (as one judge stated: "While the rules
envision ex parte TROs, most courts are reluctant to grant ex parte applications.
Judges want to hear from both sides."8), a court will likely require strong

6. The District of Columbia and 42 states' rules of civil procedure similarly condition
temporary, ex parte orders on a finding of "immediate and irreparable" injury or harm:
Alabama [Ala. R.Civ. P. Rule 65], Alaska [A.S. § 09.40.230], Arizona [Ariz. R. Civ. P. 65(d),
Arkansas [Ark. R.C.P. 65], Colorado [Colo. R.Civ. P. 65], Delaware [Del. Ch. Ct. R. 65],
Florida [Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.610], Georgia [Ga. Code Ann. Section 9-11-65], Hawaii [Hi. R. Civ
P. 65], Idaho [I.R.C.P. 65], Illinois [735 ILCS 5/11-101], Indiana [Ind. R. Trial P. 65(B)],
Kansas [Kan. Stat. Ann. Section 60-903], Louisiana [La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. Art. 3603],
Maine [Me. R. Civ. P. 65], Maryland [MD R SPEC P Rule 15-504], Massachusetts [Mass.
R.C.P. 65], Michigan [Mi. R. Spec. P. M.C.R. 3.310], Minnesota [Minn. St. R.C.P. 65.01],
Mississippi [Miss. R. R.C.P. 65], Missouri [Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 92.02], Montana [Mont. Code
Ann. Section 27-19-315], Nevada [Nev. R. Civ. P. 65], New Hampshire [N.H.R. Prob. Ct. R.
161], New Jersey [N.J. Ct. R. R. 4:52-1], New Mexico [N.M.R.A. 1-066], New York
[N.Y.C.P.L.R. 6301], North Carolina [N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. IA-1, 65], Ohio [Oh. St. R.C.P.
65], Oklahoma [Okla. Stat. Ann. Tit. 12 Section 1384.1], Oregon [Or. R. Civ. P. 79],
Pennsylvania [Pa. R.C.P. No. 1531], Rhode Island [Super. R. Civ. P. 65], South Carolina
[S.C.R.C.P. 65], South Dakota [S.D. Codified Laws Section 15-6-65(b)], Tennessee [Tenn. R.
Civ. P. 65.04], Texas [Tex. R.C.P. 680], Utah [Utah R. Civ. P. 65A], Vermont [Vt. R. Civ. P.
65], Washington [Wash. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 65], West Virginia [W. Va. R. Civ. P. 65], and
Wyoming [Wyo. R. Civ. P. 65]. Seven States instead require only "irreparable" or "great"
harm: California [add cite to 527.6(b)(70(d)], Connecticut [Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. Section 52473], Iowa [Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1502], Kentucky [Ky. R. Civ. P.65.07], Nebraska [Neb. Rev.
Stat. Ann. Section 25-1063], North Dakota [N.D.R. Civ. P. 65], and Wisconsin [Wis. Stat.
Ann. Section 813.025]; Virginia takes a different approach [Va. Code Ann. Section 8.01-629].
7. Dig. Generation, 2012 WL 315480.
8. Randy Wilson, J., From My Side of the Bench: Restraining Orders, 62 THE
ADVOCATE XIII (2013).
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evidence of the claimed "imminent" and "irreparable" harm sought to be
avoided, and will deny a TRO when that evidence has not been presented to the
court's satisfaction as exemplified in the Digital Generation case.
We also begin our analysis with the law on ex parte orders outside of the
context of domestic violence cases to help explain a judicial puzzle that we
consider in Section IV. Some judges in jurisdictions with order of protection
statutes that do not require that the petitioner show "immediate and present
danger of harm," still focus on how imminent the future harm will be. 9 And,
problematically, they do so by focusing on when the last act of violence has taken
place. These courts have denied ex parte orders of protection when the last act of
violen~e took place more than a few days ago. 10 When the petitioner fails to
appear in court seeking relief shortly after abuse has occurred or been threatened,
some judges view such time delay as evidence that even the petitioner does not
really believe there was an immediate harm that needed to be handled by the
court ex parte. As contrasted with a judge trained in the dynamics of domestic
violence recognizing the numerous reasons survivors of domestic violence have
for delaying in seeking legal help as explained in Section III. It thus appears that
judges have created a "timing requirement" for ex parte orders of protection due
in part to the fact that "immediate" harm is such a key concept for ex parte orders
in other more general contexts and due to their lack of understanding of the
dynamics of domestic violence. In Section IV infra, we discuss how judges may
be subconsciously following the "script" used in ex parte orders in other contexts
when they have a domestic violence case before them, even when the legislative
language purposefully differs from that script. In Section III, we also explain
how failure to understand the realities of the dynamics of domestic violence can
cause judges to fail to "see the wrecking ball in motion."

9. For example, the trial court in Lewis v. Lewis, 728 S.E.2d 741, 43-44 (Ga. Ct. App.
2012)., denied a protective order because the wife failed to establish that her husband had
committed a "reasonably recent" act of family violence against her, even though the statute in
Georgia does not require a showing of an immediate and present danger of abuse and instead
only requires that family violence has occurred in the past and may occur in the future (the
appellate court properly reversed this denial of a protective order). Similarly, some judges in
Illinois have been observed to deny an emergency order of protection due to the time that has
passed between the last act of abuse and when the petitioner seeks the order of protection, in
some cases when the delay is just a few days or one week after the last act of abuse. See Debra
Stark, Survey ofLawyers and Domestic Violence Advocates on Application ofthe ID VA (2013)
(on file with author, hereinafter Survey ofLawyers and D. V. Advocates). This is the case even
though the Illinois Domestic Violence Act does not include a requirement that the petitioner
promptly file for an order of protection after the last act of abuse and instead requires a very
different test. A test more consistent with the realities of domestic violence, that further abuse
is likely to occur if notice of the order of protection hearing is given to the respondent. Hence
a temporary, ex parte order is granted which the respondent can defend against in a later
hearing after notice of the granted order is provided through service of summons.
10. See Stark, supra note 9.
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PRECONDITIONS FOR EXP ARTE ORDERS OF PROTECTION; ARE
THEY CONSISTENT WITH THE REALITIES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE?

States differ in the preconditions survivors of domestic violence need to
satisfy to obtain ex parte orders of protection 11 as well as the remedies available
under state statutes. 12 Despite these differences, there are two basic remedies that
are available in virtually every state: the remedy for the abusive intimate partner
to stay away from the petitioner and to stop abusing the petitioner; 13 and there
are two basic preconditions in virtually every state: that there has been past abuse
and a danger of future abuse. 14
The key differences among the statutory approaches on preconditions to
obtaining an ex parte order of protection are:
1.
what types of abuse qualify for the order of protection (requiring
physical violence or threats of physical violence, 15 versus including
other forms of harmful abuse too 16);
11.
to what degree of certainty the petitioner must show the danger of
future abuse (that it "will" occur, 17 is "likely" 18 to occur versus

11. Also, sometimes called herein: "protection order", "protective order", or
"restraining order".
12. Debra Stark, What's Law Got To Do With It? Confronting Judicial Nullification of
Domestic Violence Remedies, IO NW. J. L. & Soc. POL'Y 130, 180-81 (2015).
13. Id.
14. ABA COMM'N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, STANDARDS OF PROOF FOR DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE
CIVIL
PROTECTION
ORDERS
(CPOs)
BY
STATE
(2009),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/domviol/pdfs/Standards_of_Proof_b
y_State.pdf.
15. See, e.g., Margaret Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies and
Reclaiming Domestic Violence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1107, 1111-12 (2009). Johnson
states that all states provide an order of protection based on physical violence, most states do
so for what amounts to criminal acts, but only 1/3 do so for coercive control, false
imprisonment, restricting liberty, or based on psychological, emotional or economic abuse. Id.
at 1113 and 1134-38; Jeffrey Baker, Enjoining Coercion: Squaring Civil Protection Orders
with the Realities of Domestic Abuse, 11 J.L. & FAM. STIJD. 35 (2008). According to Baker,
most states define the requisite abuse for an order of protection to be physical injury or
imminent tangible threat of violence. Id. at 35. Only five states include non-violence,
emotional or psychological abuse for the abuse to lead to an order of protection remedy. Id. at
43.
16. Johnson, supra note 15; Baker, supra note 15.
17. See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.§ 600.2950 (West, Westlaw through P.A.2016, No.
563 of the 2016 Reg. Sess., 98th Leg.) ("immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage
will [emphasis added] result from the delay required to effectuate notice or notice will itself
precipitate adverse action before a personal protection order can be issued").
18. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 209A, §4 (West, Westlaw through Chap. 5 of the
2017 !st Annual Sess.)(plaintiffmust "demonstrate[] a substantial likelihood of immediate
danger of abuse"); and South Dakota (S.D. Codified Laws Section 22-19A-12
(2017))("immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage is likely [emphasis added] to result
before an adverse party or the party's attorney can be heard in opposition").
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"may" 19 or "could"20 occur or there is a "danger" of further
abuse2 1);
whether the future abuse must be "imminent" or an "immediate and
present danger"22 , or whether the order of protection must be
"necessary" to protect the petitioner, 23 or both24 ; and

19. See Montana (Mont. Code Ann. § 40-15-201 (West, Westlaw through 2017
Sess.)(" .. .if the court finds, on the basis of the petitioner's sworn petition or other evidence,
that harm may [emphasis added] result to the petitioner if an order is not issued before the 20day period for responding has elapsed"); and Ohio (Ohio Rev. Code Ann.§ 2919.26 (West,
Westlaw through 2017 the 132nd Gen. Assemb.)("the court... may issue a temporary
protection order as a pretrial condition ofrelease ifit finds that the safety and protection of the
complainant, alleged victim, or other family or household member of the alleged offender may
[emphasis added] be impaired by the continued presence of the alleged offender")).
20. See Washington (Wash. Rev. Code Ann.§ 26.50.070 (West, Westlaw through 2016
Reg. Sess.)) (" ... irreparable injury could [emphasis added] result from domestic violence if
an order is not issued immediately without prior notice to the respondent").
21. See Wyo. Stat. Ann.§ 35-21-104 (West CURRENT).
22. See Arizona (Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3624 (Westlaw through the First Regular
Session of the Fifty-Third Leg. (2017) ), Arkansas( Ark. Code Ann. § 9-15-206 (West,
Westlaw through the end of the 2016 Third Extraordinary Sess. of the 90th Ark. Gen.
Assemb.)),Colorado(Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-14-104.5 (West, Westlaw through First
Regular Sess. of the 71st Gen. Assemb. (2017)), Connecticut (Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b15 (West, Westlaw through Gen. Statutes of Conn., Revision of 1958, Revised to January 1,
2017)), Delaware (Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 1043 (West, Westlaw through 81 Laws 2017, ch.
2.)), District of Columbia (D.C. Code Ann. § 16-1004 (West, Westlaw through Mar. 12,
2017)), Florida (Fla. Stat. Ann. § 741.30 (West, Westlaw through Mar 13, 2017)), Hawaii
(Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 586-4 (West, Westlaw through Act 1 of the 2016 Second Special
Sess.)), Idaho, (Idaho Code Ann. § 39-6308 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 58 of the First
Reg. Sess. of the 64th Leg.)), Kansas (Kan. Stat. Ann.§ 60-3106 (West, Westlaw through Jaws
enacted during the 2017 Reg. Sess. of the Kan. Leg. effective on or before March 9, 2017)),
Kentucky (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 403.740 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 151 of the 2017 Reg.
Sess.)), Michigan (Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.2950 (West, Westlaw through No. 563 of
the 2016 Reg. Sess., 98th Leg.)), Minnesota (Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518B.01 (West, Westlaw
through chap. 10 of the 2017 Reg. Sess.)), Mississippi (Miss. Code. Ann.§ 93-21-13 (West
2017)), Nebraska (Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 42-925 (West, Westlaw through the 1st Reg. Sess.
of the 105th Leg. (2017)), North Carolina (N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 50B-2 (West, Westlaw
through the end of the 2016 Reg. Sess.)), North Dakota (2017 North Dakota Laws S.B. 2309
(West's No. 94)), Oregon (Or. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 107.718 (West, Westlaw through End of the
2016 Reg. Sess.)), South Carolina (S.C. Code Ann.§ 16-3-1760 (Westlaw through the 2016
Sess.)), Vermont (Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1104 (West, Westlaw through Law No. 3 of the First
Sess. of the 2017-2018 Vt. Gen. Assemb.)), Virginia (Va. Code Ann.§ 16.1-253.1 (West,
Westlaw through the End of2016 Reg. Sess.)), and West Virginia (W. Va. Code Ann.§ 48-5512 (West, Westlaw through leg. of the 2016 Reg. Sess.)).
23. Alabama (Ala. Code § 30-5-6 (Westlaw through Act 2017-81 of the 2017 Reg. Sess.
)),Alaska (Alaska Stat. Ann.§ 18.66.110 (West, Westlaw through the 2016 Second Reg. Sess.
through Fifth Special Sess. of the 29th Leg.).), Georgia (Ga. Code Ann.§ 19-13-3(b) (West,
Westlaw through Act 10 of the 2017 leg. sess.)), Iowa (Iowa Code Ann. § 236.4 (West,
Westlaw through the 2017 Reg. Sess.)), New Jersey (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:25-28 (West,
Westlaw through 2017)), Utah (Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-7-106 (West, Westlaw through 2016
Fourth Special Sess.)), and Virgin Islands (16 V.I.C. § 98 (Westlaw through Act 7895 of the
2016 Reg. Sess.)).
24. Louisiana (La. Stat. Ann. ~ 46:2135 (West, Westlaw through the 2017 First
Extraordinary sess.)), Maine (Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 19-A, § 4006 (Westlaw through the 2017 First
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how the "imminence" of the future abuse can be determined
(requiring a recent act of abuse 25 , recognizing how the giving of
notice itself can trigger the violence 26 , or explicitly stating that
length of time between an act of abuse and the filing of the petition
for an order of protection should not be the basis for denial of the
protection order2 7).

In this Section, we discuss these different approaches and consider which
best take into account the realities and dangers of domestic violence.
Approximately two-thirds of the state statutes require an act of physical
violence or threatened violence to obtain an order of protection. 28 But as
explained in Section III infra, there are many other forms of abuse that coercive
intimate partners use to cause their intimate partner to become dependent upon
them, including severe emotional and financial abuse. 29 These other forms of
abuse should be actionable with an order of protection, not only due to the serious
harm they cause, but also because the presence of these other forms of abuse
makes it more likely that the abuse is part of a pattern to achieve coercive control,
increasing the risk of separation assault. 30 Unlike solely financial harm (as in a
business context) that can typically be remedied with damages, death cannot be
later remedied and severe physical and emotional harm can take years to recover
from, if ever.
Since one of the key goals of civil order of protection legislation is to try to
prevent death and serious physical injury, these laws should also provide
protection from the other forms of abuse that are often precursors to serious

Reg.Sess. of the I 28th Leg.)), Massachusetts (Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 209A, §4
(Westlaw through Chap. 5 of the 2017 1st Annual Sess.)), Oklahoma (Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22,
§ 60.3 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 1 of the First Reg. Sess. of the 56th Leg. (2017))), and
Rhode Island (15 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 15-15-4 (West, Westlaw through Chap. 542 of the
Jan. 2016 sess.)).
25. Idaho (Idaho Code Ann. § 39-6308 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 58 of the First
Reg. Sess. of the 64th Leg.)), North Dakota (2017 North Dakota Laws S.B. 2309 (West's No.
94)), and Virginia (Va. Code Ann.§ 16.1-253.1 (West, Westlaw through the End of2016 Reg.
Sess.)).
26. Michigan (Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.§ 600.2950 (West)), Puerto Rico (8 L.P.R.A. §
625 (West, Westlaw through the 2010 Leg. Sess.)), and Illinois (750 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann.
60/217 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-983 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.)).
27. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-14-104.5 (West, Westlaw through First Regular Sess. of
the 71 st Gen. Assemb. (2017)).
28. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 15. Johnson indicates that all states provide an order
of protection based on physical violence, most states do so for what amounts to criminal acts,
but only 1/3 do so for coercive control, false imprisonment, restricting liberty, or based on
psychological, emotional or economic abuse. Id. at 1113 and 1134-38; and Baker, supra note
15. According to Baker, most states define the requisite abuse for an order of protection to be
physical injury or imminent tangible threat of violence. Only five states include non-violence,
emotional or psychological abuse for the abuse to lead to an order of protection remedy. Id. at
43.
29. See infra Section III.
30. See infra Section III.
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physical abuse. 31 Consistent with this, approximately one-third of the states have
expansively defined what types of abuse qualify for an order of protection and
cover forms of abuse in addition to physical violence and threats of physical
violence. 32 The approach of more expansively defining the forms of abuse that
enable a survivor of domestic violence to obtain an order of protection is more
consistent with an understanding of the realities of domestic violence, 33 and thus
better achieves the goal of the legislation to protect survivors of domestic
violence from further harmful abuse.
In addition, most states require that the future abuse to be prevented will
occur "immediately" (that there is an "immediate" and/or "present" danger of
abuse or "imminent danger"). 34 The next largest grouping of states require
31. See infra Section III.
32. See Stark, supra note 12.
33. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 13-14-100.2 (West, Westlaw through Chapter l
of the First Regular Session of the 71st General Assembly 2017) ("The general assembly
further finds and declares that domestic abuse is not limited to physical threats of violence and
harm but also includes mental and emotional abuse, financial control, document control,
property control, and other types of control that make a victim more likely to return to an
abuser due to fear of retaliation or inability to meet basic needs.); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39~
6302 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 58 of the First Regular Session of the 64th Legislature)
("[T]he legislature finds that a significant number of homicides, aggravated assaults, and
assaults and batteries occur within the home between adult members of families. Furthermore,
research shows that domestic violence is a crime which can be deterred, prevented, or reduced
by legal intervention.").
34. See ARK. CODE. ANN.§ 9-15-206 (West, Westlawthrough the end of the 2016 Third
Extraordinary Session of the 90th Arkansas General Assembly), COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 1314-104.5 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 1 of the First Regular Session of the 71st General
Assembly 2017), CONN. GEN. STAT.§ 46b-15 (West, Westlaw through General Statutes of
Connecticut, Revision of 1958, Revised to January 1, 2017), DEL. CODE ANN. tit. I 0, § I 043
(West, Westlaw through 81 Laws 2017, Ch. 2), D.C. CODE ANN.§ 16-1004(b)(l) (West,
Westlaw through March 12, 2017), FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 741.30(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through
chapters from the 2017 First Regular Session of the 25th Legislature in effect through March
13, 2017), HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 586-4(c) (West, Westlaw through Act I (End) of the 2016
Second Special Session), IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 39-6308(1) (West, Westlaw through Chapter 58
of the First Regular Session of the 64th Legislature), KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 60-3106 (West,
Westlaw through laws enacted during the 2017 Regular Session of the Kansas Legislature
effective on or before March 9, 2017), KY. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 403.740(West, Westlaw through
Chapter 124 of the 2017 Regular Session), MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 600.2950(12) (West,
Westlaw through P.A. 2016, No. 563 of the 2016 Regular Session 98th Legislature), MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(15)(i) (West, Westlaw through chapter 10 of the 2017 Regular
Session), Miss. CODE ANN.§ 93-21-13(l)(a) (West, Westlaw through laws from the 2017
Regular Session effective upon passage as approved through March 22, 2017), NEB. REv.
STAT.§ 42-925(1) (West, Westlaw through legislation effective Feb. 16, 2017 of the 1st
Regular Session of the 105th Legislature 2017), N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 50B-2(b) (West,
Westlaw through the end of the 2016 Regular Session, with the addition of S.L. 2016-125
from the 2016 Fourth Extra Session and through 2017-1 of the 2017 Regular Session of the
General Assembly), N.D. CENT. CODE ANN.§ 1-07.1-03(1) (West, Westlaw through 2017
Regular Session of the 65th Legislative Assembly approved through March 24, 2017), OR.
REv. STAT. ANN.§ 107.718(1) (West, Westlaw through End of the 2016 Reg. Sess. And ballot
measure approved at the 11/8/16 General Election), P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8, § 625(c) (West,
Westlaw through all acts translated by the Translation Office of the Puerto Rico Government
through the 2010 Legislative Session and various acts from 2011 to Sept. 2016), S.C. CODE

22

WISCONSIN JOURNAL OF LAW, GENDER & SOCIETY

[Vol. 32:1

instead a showing that the ex parte order of protection is "necessary" to protect
the plaintiff. 35 And several other states require both of these preconditions. 36 And
the statutory language normally does not provide guidance on how to determine
when those standards have been met. To determine whether there is imminent
harm, some statutes explicitly require courts to focus on when the last act of
physical injury or threat of physical injury has occurred and require a "recent"
act of domestic violence. 37 By contrast, one state statute takes the opposite
approach explicitly stating that relief should not be denied based solely on the
length of time between the last act of abuse and when a petitioner seeks the order
ofprotection. 38 The majority of the states' legislation do not expressly cover the
issue of the impact of the amount of time that passes between the last act of
required type of abuse and when the petitioner files for an order of protection.
As discussed in Section IV, some courts deny ex parte orders of protection
when they fail to find an immediate and present danger of violence due to a delay
in seeking legal help, even when the prior abuse in the past has included physical
violence. 39 They tend to look for a recent act of physical violence, and if none,
deny the order. This is particularly likely to occur when the statute narrowly
defines the abuse required for an order of protection to be physical violence or a
clear threat of physical violence. Under this narrow definition, other typical
forms of abuse that Abusive Intimate Partners use to control the Target of the
ANN.§ I 6-3-1760(A) (West, Westlaw through the 2016 session, subject to technical revisions
by the Code Commissioner as authorized by law before official publication), VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § I I 04(a)(I) (West, Westlaw through Law No. 3 of the First Session of the 2017-2018
Vermont General Assembly 2017), VA. CODE ANN.§ 16.1-253.l(A) (West, Westlaw through
the End of 2016 Reg. Sess. And includes 2016 Reg. Sess. Cc. I to 3, 32, 62, 82, 14 7, 156, I 80,
181, 197, 287, & 314), W. VA. CODE ANN.§ 48-5-512(1) (West, Westlaw through the 2016
Reg. Sess., the 2016 First Extraordinary Session, and the 2016 Second Extraordinary Session).
35. See ALA. CODE§ 30-5-6(b) (West, Westlaw through Act 2017-81 of the 2017
Regular Session), ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.66.l lO(a) West, Westlaw through the 2016
Regular Session through Fifth Special Session of the 29th Legislature), GA. CODE. ANN§ l 913-3(b) (West, Westlaw through Act 10 of 2017 legislative session), IOWA CODE ANN. §
236.4(2) (West, Westlaw through 3/27/17 from the 2017 Regular Session), N.J. STAT. ANN.§
2C-25-28(f) (West, Westlaw through L.2017, c. 34 and J.R. No. 1), UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78B7-106(a)(West, Westlaw through 2016 Fourth Special Session), V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 98(b)
(West, Westlaw through Act 7895 of the 2016 Regular Session).
36. LA. STAT. ANN.§ 46:2135(A)(West, Westlaw through the 2017 First Extraordinary
session), ME. STAT. tit. 19-a, § 4006(2) (West, Westlaw through Chapter I of the 2017 First
Regular Session of the 128th Legislature), MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 4 (West,
Westlaw through the 2016 2nd Annual Session and Chapter I of the 2017 1st Annual Session),
R.I. CODER.§ 15-5-4 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 542 of the January 2016 session).
37. See IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 39-6308(3) (West, Westlaw through Chapter 58 of the First
Regular Session of the 641h Legislature), N.D. CENT. CODE. ANN. § 14-07.1-03(1) (West,
Westlaw through 2017 Regular Session of the 65 1h Legislative Assembly), VA. CODE ANN.§
16.1-253.l(A) (West, Westlawthrough
Virginia (VA Code Ann. Section 16.1-253.1) (West, Westlaw through the end of2016 Regular
Session).
38. See Cow. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 13-14-104.5(b) (West, Westlaw through Chapter I of
the First Regular Session of the 7 I ' 1 General Assembly 2017).
39. See Tosta v. Bullis, 943 A.2d 824, 829 (N.H. 2008); M.D.L. v. S.C.E., 391 S.W. 3d
525, 531 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013); But see In re Sawyer, 8 A.3d 80, 84 (N.H. 2010).
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Abuse are less likely to count in the judges' eyes in their assessment of whether
there is an immediate and present danger ofviolence. 40 Requiring a recent act of
abuse is less harmful when abuse is broadly defined (such as causing a disruption
at the petitioner's place of employment or repeatedly texting after being asked to
stop), because judges trained on the dynamics of domestic violence, including
the "escalation of violence" stage, will see the imminent danger of harm. They
can then issue an ex parte order based on these acts, since they will be picked up
under the broader definition of "abuse."
The emphasis on how the harm to be avoided is imminent is consistent with
the general laws on ex parte orders. It is also consistent with the underlying
rationale for granting ex parte orders: that there is insufficient time to give notice
because during that time the harm that is intended to be avoided will occur (i.e.
necessary to stop the wrecking ball in motion). But due to the dynamics of
domestic violence and the cycle of violence as described in Section III a long
period can run between one act of physical violence and the next one. During
that interim period, the Target of the Abuse may be engaged in acts to mollify
the Abusive Intimate Partner and the Abusive Intimate Partner may be using
other forms of abuse to control their partner. 41 In addition, the act of separating
oneself from an abusive partner often triggers separation assault. 42 Obtaining a
court order requiring one's former intimate partner to stay away is a strong
attempt to end an abusive relationship, leaving survivors of domestic violence
particularly vulnerable. For this reason, when there has been coercive abuse,
notice of the fact that an order of protection has been sought should create a
presumption of imminent danger. Indeed, there is a recognition in other situations
where ex parte orders are granted that the giving of prior notice of a temporary
restraining order can itself trigger the harm sought to be avoided. 43
Perhaps due to these realities of domestic violence and the difficulty in
demonstrating the likelihood of imminent, future abuse, several legislatures have
not required a showing of imminent harm, and instead focus on the abuse that
has already occurred as the basis for granting the ex parte order of protection.
Some state statutes on ex parte orders of protection appear to only require that
abuse as defined by their statutes has occurred and do not require evidence
beyond that on the likelihood of future abuse as a precondition to an ex parte
order. 44 Others only require a finding that harm may result to the petitioner if an

40. See infra Section III.
41. See infra Section III.
42. See infra Section III.
43. Hon. Randy Wilson, From My Side of the Bench: Restraining Orders, ADVOCATE,
Spring 2013, at 13 ("There are some situations, however, where it is essential to hear an
application ex parte. For example, if the defendant has embezzled money and the plaintiff is
trying to free bank accounts, you have to proceed ex parte. If you give notice, the defendant
will undoubtedly commit the very act you are trying to prohibit.").
44. See IND. CODE ANN.§ 34-26-5-9(a) (West, Westlaw through legislation of the 2016
Second Regular Session of the I 19th General Assembly), Mo. CODE ANN. § 4-505(a)(l)
(West, Westlaw through Chapter 2 from the 2017 Regular Session of the General Assembly),
N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 40-13-3.2(A) (West, Westlaw through Chs. 3, 19 of the !st Regular Session
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order is not issued until after notice was given. 45 Others condition the ex parte
order on a finding that the safety and protection of the petitioner may be impaired
by the continued presence of the alleged offender. 46 Others condition the ex parte
order on a finding that irreparable injury could result from domestic violence if
an order is not issued immediately without prior notice to the respondent. 47
Others only require a finding that "there exists a danger of further domestic
abuse."48
The above-described statutes mark a major departure from the normal
approach taken in general ex parte TRO type cases (as reflected in the federal
rules of civil procedure) that immediate and irreparable injury will result before
the adverse party can be heard. 49 This loosening of the standard, that must be met
to obtain an ex parte order in a domestic violence case, may be due to several
reasons. First, the harm to the petitioner when the ex parte order in a domestic
violence case is not granted could be death or serious bodily injury, while the
harm to the petitioner in non-domestic violence cases, typically is only a financial
loss. Second, legislatures that loosened the standard may have done so because
they were made aware of the nature and dynamics of domestic violence; that
when the violence and other forms of abuse are used to exercise coercive control
over the petitioner, there is both an ever-looming danger of further violence and
a likely trigger of that violence from the act of separating and seeking an order
of protection. Knowing that there are tremendous barriers to safely leaving an
abusive intimate partner50 and that it is common for survivors of domestic
violence to experience years of physical violence and other forms of abuse before
seeking an order of protection, educated legislatures may have opted not to
require a "recent" act of violence as a proxy for the requirement of "imminent"
harm.
Ill.

THE COUNTER-INTUITIVE REALITIES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
STEREOTYPES, HEURISTICS AND OTHER COGNITIVE PHENOMENON
THAT IMPACT JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING

In 1984, staff at the Domestic Abuse Intervention Project convened focus
groups of women who were battered, and after listening to their stories, they
documented the most common abusive behaviors and tactics used against these
women and created the "Power and Control Wheel" based on what they learned.
While each individual and each story of abuse is unique, there are certain strong

of the 53rd Legislature 2017), Wrs. STAT. ANN. § 813.12 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Act
2).
45. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-20(4) (West, Westlaw through chapters effective
March 15, 2017 session).
46. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 2919.26(C)(I) (LexisNexis 2015).
47. WASH. REV. CODE§ 26.50.070 (2016).
48. WYQ. STAT. ANN.§ 35-21-104 (2016) (emphasis added).
49. See discussion supra Section I.
50. See infra Section III.
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patterns of abuse described and illustrated in the Power and Control Wheel, 51
many of which would not appear to make sense if one were not already trained
on the dynamics of domestic violence. It is important to identify and explain
these counter-intuitive aspects of domestic violence because when someone's
story does not make sense to a judge, then the judge is less likely to believe their
story. 52
When the goal of intimate partner violence is to exert power over and
coercively control the survivor of this violence (the "Target of the Abuse"),
versus solely an anger management issue, 53 there is typically a "Cycle of
Violence," 54 and a pattern of inflicting various forms of abuse calculated to create
dependence on the Abusive Partner. 55 Surprising to those not trained in the
dynamics of domestic violence, the non-physical abuse can be even more
harmful to the Target of the Abuse than the physical violence, 56 and the deadliest
time for the Target of the Abuse is when that person attempts to permanently
leave the Abusive Partner. 57
Those assisting battered women in the shelters learned that typically there
was no physical abuse early on in the relationship, but to the contrary, the
Abusive Partner would appear to be very attentive, protective, and loving
towards the Target of the Abuse (the "honeymoon" stage). 58 The Targets of the
Abuse typically do not initially realize how their intimate partner is trying to
isolate them from family and friends and attempting to control their every move

51. See Why was the Power and Control Wheel created?, DoMESTIC ABUSE
INTERVENTION PROGRAMS, https://www.theduluthmodel.org/wheels/faqs-about-the-wheels/,
(last visited April 3, 2017).
52. See Jacqueline R. Evans et al., Validating a new assessment method for deception
detection: Introducing a Psychologically Based Credibility Assessment Tool, 2 J. APPLIED RES.
MEMORY & COGNITION 33 (2013).
53. Abuse is more likely to be due to an anger management issue when the abusive
person is abusive to people in addition to that person's intimate partner and children (i.e.
engages in road rage, acts out at the person's place of employment, etc.). When a person is
only abusive towards an intimate partner, it is likely due to an attitude that they are entitled
and should behave this way and desire to exercise coercive power and control over their
intimate partner. Debra Stark, CENTER FOR Aov ANCING DOMESTIC PEACE, INC., presentation
on Mar. 26, 2016 (on file with the author).
54. See The Cycle of Domestic Violence, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RoUNDTABLE,
http://www.domesticviolenceroundtable.org/domestic-violence-cycle.htrnl, (last visited April
3, 2017) (describing the cycle of violence where many survivors of domestic violence describe
experiencing a tension building phase, followed by an acute battering episode, followed by a
"honeymoon" phase, and then repeating itself over and over).
55. See The Power and Control Wheel, DoMESTIC ABUSE INTERVENTION PROGRAMS,
https://www.theduluthmodel.org/wheels/faqs-about-the-wheels/, (last visited April 4, 201 7).
56. See NAT'L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, FACTS ABOUT DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ABUSE (2015).
57. Jana Kasperkevic, Private Violence, THE GUARDIAN:
PERSONAL FINANCE (Oct.
20, 2014, 3 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/money/us-money-blog/2014/oct/20/domesticprivate-violence-women-men-abuse-hbo-ray-rice (up to 75% of abused women who are
murdered are killed after they leave their abusive intimate partner).
58. See Domestic Violence Roundtable supra note 54.
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in a coercive fashion. 59 Over time, the Targets of the Abuse would develop
feelings oflove and loyalty towards the Abusive Partner and extreme dependence
upon them as well. 60 The stories told indicated that various forms of emotional
abuse, over time, would escalate into physical abuse, and the emotional abuse
tended to be calculated to demean the targets, cause them to question themselves,
and to wonder if they were to blame for their partner's statements and actions.
This "post-honeymoon" stage has been referred to as the "tension building
phase" stage, which could last for days, months or even years if the Targets of
the Abuse found ways to mollify their Abusive Partners. 61 But, eventually, this
tension would erupt into physical violence by the Abusive Partner against the
Target of the Abuse. 62 After the first act of physical violence, to keep the targets
with them, the Abusive Partners would initially follow the physical violence with
apologies and promises that it would never happen again, and a new
"honeymoon" period could begin, which eventually would be followed with
"escalation" and then finally "eruption" with further physical violence. 63 By the
time many targets realized that the person they had loved was not going to
change, the targets might already have become highly dependent on the intimate
partner (often having lost their jobs due to the abuse and lacking the money to
pay for a roof over their heads or childcare) making leaving them very difficult. 64
Another important, counter-intuitive phenomenon that is well documented
is that Abusive Partners do not stop trying to control the Target of Abuse after
that person leaves them, but instead continue to try to control them thereafter,
either through promising to change (earlier in the relationship) or by engaging in
various forms of abuse to coerce this return. 65 This explains why on average it
takes seven attempts of leaving an Abusive Partner for the Target of the Abuse
to ultimately be successful at separating. 66 Further underscoring the counterintuitive nature of the realities of domestic violence, it is not uncommon for an
Abusive Partner to kick the Target of the Abuse out of the family home. A judge
may mistakenly focus on that occurrence as evidence that the Abusive Partner
59. Lisa Aronson Fontes, When Relationship Abuse Is Hard to Recognize, PSYCHOLOGY
TODAY:
INVISIBLE
CHAINS
(Aug.
26,
2015),
https ://www. psycho logytoda y .com/b log/invisible-chains/201508/when-relationship-abuseis-hard-recogn ize.
60. Id.; Melinda Smith & Jeanne Segal, Domestic Violence and Abuse: Are You or
Someone You Care About in an Abusive Relationship?, HELPGUIDE.ORG (April, 2017),
https://www.helpguide.org/articles/abuse/domestic-violence-and-abuse.htm.
61. See The Cycle ofDomestic Violence, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ROUNDTABLE,
http://www.domesticviolenceroundtable.org/dvcycle (last visited Mar. 30, 2017).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See Barriers to Leaving, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ROUNDTABLE,
http://www.domesticviolenceroundtable.org/abusestay (last visited Mar. 30, 2017).
65. See Post-Separation Power and Control Wheel, DOMESTIC ABUSE INTERVENTION
PROGRAMS, https://www.theduluthmodel.org/cms/files/Using%20Children%20Wheel.pdf
(last visited Mar. 30, 2017).
66. See Kathryn Robinson, 50 Obstacles to Leaving, THE NATIONAL DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE HOTLINE, http://www.thehotline.org/2013/06/50-obstacles-to-leaving-1-l 0/ (Jun.
10, 2013).
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no longer wants to have any contact with the Target of the Abuse and that there
is no longer any clear danger. But when an Abusive Partner knows that the Target
of the Abuse is completely dependent on them, the act of kicking that person out
of the home is actually another form of abuse designed to coerce the Target of
the Abuse to bend to their will in order to regain a roof over their head and over
their children's head. 67
Most important, perhaps the harshest reality of domestic violence is that
many Targets of Abuse face the quandary of trying to calculate what is more
dangerous, staying with the Abusive Partner or leaving them. Abusive Partners
threaten Targets of Abuse in multiple ways about what will happen if the Targets
of Abuse try to leave them. These threats include at the most severe level: killing
them, killing or taking away their children, killing other family members or
beloved pets, and getting them kicked out of the country if they are
undocumented. 68 Targets of Abuse take these threats very seriously, having seen
that other threats of violence and other forms of abuse have been carried out in
the past. 69 But when judges are not aware of "separation assault" and do not
realize the tremendous danger that continues after separation, then the Targets of
Abuse are less likely to obtain the legal remedies they need to be safe. 70

67. No Room at the Shelter, Now What?, DoMESTICSHELTERS.ORG,
https://www.domesticshelters.org/domestic-violence-articles-information/no-room-at-theshelter#.WNwHzlXyuM8 (Apr. 26, 2015) [hereinafter No Room At the Shelter]. Although
there are shelters for survivors of domestic violence, there are more survivors seeking this
shelter than available spaces. As reported in No Room at the Shelter, for every six requests
that were filled for shelter for survivors of domestic violence, one request was not. They
calculated this statistic based on the fact that more than 167,000 requests for emergency
shelter by domestic violence survivors went unmet during one fiscal year, while I million
other requests for shelter were fulfilled (citing statistics compiled by the National Network to
End Domestic Violence). In addition, the housing provided is temporary in nature and ifat
the end of their residency they still lack the funds to pay for housing, and they have nowhere
else to go, they are likely to return to the abusive partner for shelter. It has been reported
that, 50% of women who are homeless report that domestic violence was the cause of their
homelessness.
68. See Post-Separation Power and Control Wheel, supra note 65.
69. Statistics collected by the government reflect that abuse not only continues after
separation from an abusive intimate partner, but actually increases. According to the Bureau
of Justice Statistics' National Crime Victimization Survey, about 75% of the visits to the
emergency rooms by battered women occur after separation and about 75 percent of the calls
to law enforcement for intervention and assistance in domestic violence occur after
separation from batterers. See Domestic Violence: Disturbing Facts about Domestic
Violence, Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT,
http://www.lapdonline.org/get_informed/content_basic_view/8891 (last visited Mar. 30,
2017).
70. See Jacqueline Clarke, (In)Equitable Relief How Judicial Misconceptions about

Domestic Violence Prevent Victims from Attaining Innocent Spouse Relief under I.R.C. Sec.
6015(/), 22 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 825,840 (2014) (discussing O'Neil v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 104 T.C.M. 724 (2012), a case where the court ruled that
the petitioner for tax relief did not fear retaliation if they did not sign the tax return credible
because she was legally separated from her husband when the return was signed and there
was no documentation of the abuse).
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The purposes section of some state order of protection statutes explicitly
address some of the dynamics of domestic violence such as the fact that there are
phases to the domestic violence, 71 an escalation of violence, 72 the problem of
hesitating to get help and being trapped in abusive relationships due to fear of
retaliation and stigma, 73 and due to financial dependence. 74
Victims of sexual assault who do not report the crime, as well as victims who
do report but whose case is not prosecuted, still need and deserve protection from
future interactions with the perpetrator, as many victims experience long-lasting
physical and emotional trauma from unwanted contact with the perpetrator.
Even when state statutes are well-written and recognize the realities of
domestic violence, it is very important for judges who preside over orders of
protection to understand these realities to see the "wrecking ball in motion." They
need to understand the cycle of violence, the likely escalation of abuse, and the
use of multiple forms of abuse to coercively control the Target of Abuse, causing
that person to become highly dependent on the Abusive Partner. It is also critical
that the judge understands that Abusive Partners do not stop trying to control the
Target of Abuse after that person leaves them, but instead seek to continue, and
in some cases escalate, the abuse as a means to continue to control them and get
them back. When judges (or any other decision maker on a legal matter) fail to
understand the above counterintuitive phenomenon they are likely to not believe
the Target of Abuse when that person seeks an order of protection, or seeks other
forms of legal relief. 75
These documented phenomena provide answers to typical questions judges
have that cause these judges to not believe what they are hearing or not recognize
the looming danger of the situation:

71. VA. CODE ANN. § 63 .2-1611 (LEXIS through the 2016 Reg. Sess. and Acts 2017,
cc. 1-3,32,55,58,82, 107,110,147,156, I68and 181).
72. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/102(1) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through the
end of the 2016 Reg. Legis. Sess.) ("Recognize domestic violence as a serious
crime ... which ... promotes a pattern of escalating violence which frequently culminates in
intra-family homicide and creates an emotional atmosphere that is not conducive to healthy
childhood development.); see also ME. REv. STAT. Tit. 19-A § 4001(1) (LexisNexis, LEXIS
through Ch. 2 of the 1st Reg. Sess. of the 128th Legis.).
73. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/102(4) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through the end of the
2016 Reg. Legis. Sess.); NEB. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 29-4301 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through the
2017 105th First Sess., LBJ through LBS, LB22, LB45, LB56, LB74, LB80, LBJ 19, LBI31
and LBI32).
74. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/102(4) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through the end of the
2016 Reg. Legis. Sess.).
75. See, e.g., Alana Bowman, A Matter ofJustice: Overcoming Juror Bias in
Prosecutions ofBatterers Through Expert Witness Testimony of the Common Experiences of
Battered Women, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 219,246 (1992); Laurie Kohn,
Barriers to Reliable Credibility Assessments: Domestic Violence Victim-Witnesses, 11 AM.
U. J. GENDER, Soc. PoL'Y & L. 733 (2003); Clarke, supra note 70 at 828 (showing a lack of
knowledge on the dynamics of domestic violence, its causes, and impacts, affect judicial
decisions not only on orders of protection, but other areas of law as well such as tax liability
relief, course custody/visitation orders in a divorce/parentage case, self-defense claims in a
criminal case, etc.).
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1. "If all these terrible things really happened in the past, why didn't she
leave or seek an order of protection sooner?"76
2. "If those things had really happened, why didn't she call the police to
report the crime77 or, when the police were called, why wasn't an arrest
made; why didn't she press charges?"78
3. "If those things really happened, why didn't she tell family, friends or coworkers?"79
4. "If those things really happened why didn't she go to the hospital?"80
76. Carol E. Jordan et al, Denial of Emergency Protection: Factors Associated with
Court Decision Making, 23 Violence and Victims 603 (2008) (reviewing 2,205 petitions
denied by a Kentucky court solely based on the pleadings). See Tosta v. Bullis, 943 A.2d
824, 826-27 (N.H. 2008). See also Stark, supra note 9 (finding 81.8 percent reported that
they observed a judge state that he/she would not grant an ex parte emergency order of
protection because the last incident of abuse took place "too long ago" in the court's
judgment).
77. O'Neil v. Comm'r oflnternal Revenue, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) 724, 725 (2012).
(noting there was no documented evidence of abuse, no police reports, no witness
statements, only her words he bullied her emotionally and psychologically and threatened
her with trouble if she didn't sign the return; court thus ruled she was not abused and
therefore not entitled to relief for tax liability based on a fear of retaliation if she failed to
sign the joint tax return).
78. Sotuyo v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, No. 25692-1 OS., 2012 WL I 021306, at
*6 (T.C. March 27, 2012) (ruling there was insufficient evidence of abuse even though the
police report identified the wife as a victim and the wife testified to the abuse, finding that
each spouse's testimony was 'self-serving' so not accepting it, and finding that wife did not
press charges nor was an arrest made; court also noted that the parties sought joint legal and
physical custody and the court did not order supervised visitation. Consequently, she failed
to show that she failed to challenge the omission in the tax return due to a fear ofretaliation).
Id. at 5. See also Tosta v. Bullis, 943 A.2d 824, 829 (N.H. 2008).
79. In re J.D. v. N.D., 652 N.Y.S.2d 468,469 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1996) ("Respondent,
when confronted with the question of her remaining so long with the Petitioner and why she
didn't tell anyone about her plight, replied that she was stupid, afraid and embarrassed about
her personal Ii fe. She also stated that the Petitioner stripped her of everything as a person."
Id. at 471 (reflecting an understanding of the dynamics of domestic violence, the lower court
stated in the custody case before it that "While Petitioner tried to show that Respondent was
a loner with no friends, he failed to explain how she came to be that way. No extended
analysis is needed to conclude that Respondent significantly withdrew from the outside
world as a direct result of Petitioner's dominance over every aspect of her life. Petitioner
turned Respondent into a virtual prisoner by his own acts, and is now seeking to blame her
for it.").
80. Pratt v. Wood, 620 N.Y.S. 2d 741,553 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (ruling that family
court erred when it excluded testimony on the psychological and behavioral characteristics
typically shared by victims of abuse in a familial setting that are not generally known by the
average person: "Family court's ruling was particularly prejudicial to petitioners since it
found Wood's testimony to be incredible because she never went to a hospital or sought
treatment. In fact, Wood's failure to tell anyone about the abuse or to seek help is a
characteristic typically shared by victims of domestic violence. Thus, had Family Court
admitted McGrath's testimony, it is conceivable that its resolution of Wood's credibility
might have been different." See also, McKnight v. Commissioner oflnternal Revenue, 92
T.C.M. (CCH) 76, 81 (2006) (ruling that "The abuses outlined in the claimant's arguments
do not appear to have been more than her willingness to hold a subservient role in the
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5. "If those things really happened, why did she recant and not help with the
criminal prosecution?"81
6. "If those things really happened, why did she drop the order of protection
she had?" 82
7. "If those things really happenet:i, why did she return to him repeatedly
after leaving him?"83
8. "If those things really happened, why did she minimize or deny the
violence to the police?"84
9. "Since so much time has passed since that happened, where 1s the
emergency necessitating an ex parte order?"85
10. "Since so much time has passed since that happened, what is the
likelihood there will be further abuse?" 86
11. "He only struck her once, so is it really "domestic violence" (necessary
to issue an order of protection)?"87
relationship." But the court ruled: "We disagree. The material petitioner submitted to
respondent and which is found in the administrative record in this case, as well as vivid and
credible trial testimony herein, thoroughly establishes the extensive and severe abuse
petitioner suffered from John."). Id. at 77 (noting that the petitioner did not go to a hospital
after her husband cut her throat with a broken wine glass because she feared he would be
arrested and then might seek to kill her so she did her best to stop the bleeding).
81. See also Kohn, supra note 75, at 737-739.
82. First author has frequently observed judges ask the petitioner why she dropped a
prior emergency order of protection (i.e. obtained the emergency order and failed to reappear in court to obtain the plenary order of protection in the order of protection court call
at the specialized domestic violence court in Cook County, Illinois). These judges did not
specifically preface this questions with: "If those things really happened ... " but, it seemed
implied. There are many reasons why a person might not appear in court for the plenary
order of protection even though the prior alleged abuse did in fact occur. These include:
threats from the respondent to commit worse abuse, promises from the respondent to stop the
abuse, appearing in court for the return date but the case is continued for lack of service,
problems with taking time off from work to attend the next hearing, fearing to see the
respondent at the plenary order of protection hearing, and lacking legal representation for the
plenary order of protection and not knowing what to do and what to say if the respondent
appears and challenges the petitioner.
83. See McKnight, 92 T.C.M. at 77. (rejecting the IRS finding of insufficient evidence
of abuse and explained why the petitioner returned to her abusive husband noting she did not
have a job, credit, nearby family, or other means of support and only a few articles of
clothing in her possession).
84. See Bowman, supra note 75, at 248.
85. First author has heard judges make this remark in court cases, leading her to
document this issue further in the Survey ofLawyers and D. V. Advocates, where nine often
organizations responding to the survey indicated that they had heard the same remark from
judges. Of the nine reporting they observed this, one reported "countless" times, one
reported "unknown," two reported four times, one reported fifty times, one reported three
times, one reported five times, one reported two to five times, two reported ten times. See
Stark supra note 9.
86. See Tosta v. Bullis, 943 A. 2d 824, 826-27 ; M.D.L. v. S.C.E., 391 SW 3d 525,
530 (Mo. Ct. App 2013); and Lewis v. Lewis, 728 S.E. 3d 741, 743 (Ga. App. 2012)
(discussing the lower court ruling).
87. See Bowman, supra note 75, at 244.
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12. "If she is still married to him, they share joint custody, or they are in
regular contact with each other, how serious could the abuse be?"88
Judges who have not received prior special training (or not benefitted from
hearing expert testimony in the case before them), may also be strongly affected
by stereotypes they hold as to who is a victim of domestic violence, how they are
affected by this experience, and how they should react to it. 89 For example, one
stereotype is that victims of domestic violence are poor and not educated. 90 But
domestic violence can happen to anyone, including graduates of Harvard College
with successful careers. 91 A judge might presume that all victims of domestic
violence will react in court by breaking down into tears while on the stand
relaying their story and state that they fear the Abusive Partner. 92 But some
survivors of domestic violence will instead appear impassive on the stand,93 or
angry and defiant, and not say that they fear the Abusive Partner. 94 This is
because there are numerous and divergent reactions to the trauma of domestic
violence. 95 When a judge possesses firmly held views of who is a likely victim
of domestic violence and how that person should react when telling their story,
this will affect the credibility of the person seeking the order of protection in the ·
judge's eyes and/or diminish their assessment of the level of danger in the
situation, and can lead to an improper denial of the order of protection sought. 96
88. See Clarke, supra note 70, at 841 (discussing a case where the court stated that the
abuse was not serious if the petitioner was still married, shared joint custody, or the parties
maintained regular contact with one another: Bruen v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 98
T.C.M. 400,403 (2009)).
89. See Bowman, supra note 75, at 247; See also, Kohn, supra note 70, at 734.
(discussing how preconceptions of how survivors of domestic violence will react to the
abuse damages credibility when the survivor witness presents themselves on the stand in an
atypical and non-paradigmatic fashion. Kohn focused on those who refuse to admit, cannot
access or does not experience fear of the batterer, and the victim who feels anger towards her
assailant).
90. See Bowman, supra note 75, at 242-43 (stereotype that only those from a lower
socio-economic status are victims of domestic violence and only those from a lower socioeconomic status are batterers).
91. See Leslie Morgan Steiner, Why domestic violence victims don't leave, TED TALK
(Nov. 2012),
https://www.ted.com/talks/leslie_morgan_steiner_why_domestic_violence_victims_don_t_le
ave/transcript?language=en.
92. See Bowman, supra note 75, at 247. See also Kohn, supra note 75, at 733-34.
93. Id. at 734-35.
94. Id.
95. There are a wide range of common reactions to the trauma of domestic violence,
including: feeling detached, numb, having trouble concentrating or making decisions, feeling
on guard and constantly alert, feeling angry, and becoming easily upset or agitated. See
Common Reactions After Trauma, NATIONAL CENTER FOR PTSD,
https://www.ptsd.va.gov/public/problems/common-reactions-after-trauma.asp (last visited
August 28, 2016).
96. See Stark, supra note 9 (54.5% of those surveyed stated that they observed a judge
deny an ex parte emergency order of protection because the judge asked the petitioner if she
feared the respondent and the petitioner said no). And it is important to realize that just
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Similarly, if a judge expects a victim of abuse to cower during a beating or to
attempt to flee an assault, but not fight back, the judge might view a fighting back
response as evidence that the victim of abuse is not really a victim, not afraid of
the abuse, and instead engaging in "mutual fighting". 97 Judges who engage in
any of this thinking are likely not to grant an order of protection when the
petitioner before them fails to conform with the judge's preconceptions. 98
Finally, judges are unlikely to see how certain innocuous appearing actions
by an Abusive Partner are in fact evidence of imminent danger unless they have
learned of the importance of according weight to the pattern of abuse in the case
before them. For example, in one case, police on the scene responding to a 911
call noticed at one point that the Abusive Partner was moving his hands up and
down on an iced water bottle as the victim was answering police questions on
what had happened. 99 They found out later when they took the victim outside of
the Abusive Partner's range of sight that he would use an iced water bottle to
beat her. 100 His holding the bottle and calling her attention to it was his way to
signal to her that she would be beaten if she told the police what had happened. 101
In a similar vein, if a judge hears that a victim of domestic violence shot her
husband after he approached her with one fist clenched and said to her "What are
you going to do, call up the white man?" with an angry expression, the judge or
jury might not, conclude that she was in imminent danger of serious physical
injury. 102 But if the judge or jury learned that the husband had in the past severely
beaten her, that after one of those beatings she had called the police and he was
arrested, and that he warned her that if she ever called the white police on him
again he would kill her, the judge and jury would better understand why the wife
reasonably feared imminent serious (potentially deadly) injury from her
husband. 103

because a domestic violence survivor fails to state that she/he feels afraid and instead acts
angry or defiant (perhaps because they have been taking steps to regain control of their life)
does not mean that there is not looming danger necessitating and order of protection to
become safer.
97. The first author observed this when speaking with a judge on why the judge would
have denied an emergency order of protection in a simulated emergency order of protection
hearing that the judge presided over for first author's students in Cook County Circuit Court.
The impact of"fighting back" is addressed in Section 214(e) of the Illinois Domestic
Violence Act, which states that "a denial of any remedy shall not be based, in whole or in
part, on evidence that (3) Petitioner acted in self-defense ... provided that, if petitioner
utilized force, such force was justifiable under Article 7 ofthe Criminal Code of2012." 750
ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214(e).
98. Catherine M. Naughton et. al, 'Ordinary decent domestic violence': A discursive
analysis offamily law judges' interviews, 26(3) DISCOURSE & SOCIETY 349, 360-61 (2015).
99. Conversation of first author with Aileen Robinson, Program Development
Coordinator, Domestic Violence Program, Chicago Police Department, in Chicago, Illinois
during a guest lecture by Ms. Robinson to first author's Domestic Violence Clinic class.
I 00. Id.
101. Id.
102. Petition for Executive Clemency at 13, In re Rosa M. Williams (Ill. filed Oct.
1990) (on file with the first author).
I 03. Id. at 3.
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Cognitive science and social psychological research on how people make
evaluations and judgments have identified numerous factors that can help us
understand how judges decide whether to grant orders of protection. In the
remainder of this Section, we introduce four of these cognitive and social
psychological factors: (i) script following, (ii) decision-making shortcuts such as
heuristics and reason-based or justification-based decision-making, (iii)
gendered stereotypes, and (iv) uncertainty discounting. In Section IV, we analyze
judicial cases and the role of these factors when judges fail to believe those who
allege they are survivors of domestic violence in need of an ex parte order of
protection. We look at these cases to analyze how these stereotypes and cognitive
phenomenon can impede a judge's accurate assessment of the danger of future
abuse.
First, judges-like all people-make sense of situations and stories and
interpret them using cognitive scripts (i.e., preconceived notions about how event
sequences unfold) and schemas (i.e., assumptions about how things work) which
organize incomplete data and fill in missing information to make sense of
information that would otherwise be incomprehensible. 104 The problem is that
these cognitive scripts and schemas can also lead to systematic,.
misunderstandings. Bartlett (1932) 105 demonstrated how this works in a famous
study in which he had his British participants read a Native American story called
the "War of the Ghosts." The story followed scripts and schemas indigenous to
Native American culture that his participants did not know. They only knew their
own British scripts and schemas. 106 When they later retold the story from
memory, they misremembered the story in systematic ways that reflected
Western stories and scripts, rather than Native American stories and scripts. 107
Causal relationships were changed and there were omissions, distortions, and
sequence inversions. 108 Likewise, judges also impose their own scripts and
schemas on the cases that they see in their courtrooms. 109 One researcher who
interviewed a judge found that the judge interpreted requests for therapeutic
counseling in child custody hearings as a manipulative ploy to gain advantage
for custody, reinterpreting a self-care script to make it fit a manipulation script. 110
Another example of applying inappropriate scripts to domestic violence
situations is when judges apply general ex parte scripts or anger management
scripts to domestic violence cases. Imposing these scripts causes some judges to
impose "timing requirements," requiring that petitioners show a recent act or
threat of physical violence even when this requirement is contrary to some of the
104. Robert P. Abelson, Psychological status of the script concept, 36(7) AM.
715, 717 (1981).
105. Erik T. Bergman & Henry L. Roediger III, Can Bartlett's repeated reproduction
experiments be replicated? 27 MEMORY & COGNITION 937, 945 (1999).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Jean M. Mandler & Nancy S. Johnson, Remembrance a/Things Passed: Story
Structure and Recall. COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 9, 140 (1977).
109. L.L. Berger, How embedded knowledge structures affect judicial decision
making: An analysis of metaphor, narrative, and imagination in child custody disputes, S.
CAL. lNTERDISC. LAW J. (2009).
110. Naughton et al., supra note 98, at 356.
PSYCHOLOGIST
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express terms of the domestic violence statute and is inconsistent with the
dynamics of domestic violence. Misunderstanding the dynamics of domestic
violence and applying their own scripts of what an "emergency" or "immediate
harm" is, and what makes "future violence likely" many judges assume that for
these to exist a recent act of violence must have taken place. They seem to
interpret violence within domestic relationships as being due to anger that flares
up, but then dissipates, and then is no longer a threat. Since they lack the scripts
to understand the dynamics of domestic violence wherein behavior is motivated
by the desire for power and control, many judges do not understand why there is
an emergency or likelihood of imminent abuse when the Target of the abuse
seeks an order of protection even when the most recent flare up of violence may
have been quite some time ago. Those who have scripts to understand the
dynamics of domestic violence will recognize that the "honeymoon" stage can
in some relationships last for a long time and that the "escalation of tension"
stage signals that the "eruption" stage is imminent and that, therefore, there is an
emergency. They will also understand about "separation assault" and how the act
of separating and seeking an order of protection is likely to trigger heightened
abuse.
In addition, judges-like all people-make decisions by utilizing heuristics
and reason-based or justification-based decision making, which narrow decisionmaking criteria down to just a few criteria, maybe even a single criterion. These
strategies provide shortcuts to answers and decisions. 111 Because judges like all
people have limited cognitive resources and working memory capacity, they
need to rely on these forms of decision making. Given these limited cognitive
resources, it is not practical or possible to take all possible relevant factors into
account, so these forms of decision making are inevitable. Heuristics are preset
decision making "tools" 112 that use just a few simple criteria to make decisions
or sometimes even a single criterion. If the right criteria are used, they are often
surprisingly effective; 113 but if the wrong criteria are used, decisions can be
problematic. For example, looking at how recent the latest violence was as a
heuristic criterion to decide whether or not to grant emergency orders of
protection can and does lead to poor decisions as described in Section IV.
Perhaps judges use this criterion, because they are thinking in terms of anger
management scripts. Given anger management scripts, this criterion can serve as
a shorthand for whether anger is likely to have dissipated which gets judges to
an answer on whether to grant an ex parte order of protection right away, but is
problematic given the dynamics of domestic violence.
Another decision-making shortcut is reason-based decision-making
wherein decision makers make complex decisions by finding one or more
justifications up to working memory capacity for their decision. 114 This form of
J 11. See, e.g., A. Tversky & D. Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124 (1974). See also A. Tversky & D. Kahneman, Availability:
A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 4 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 232 ( 1980).
112. See, e.g. GERD G!GERENZER, PETER M. TODD & THE ABC RESEARCH GROUP,
SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE Us SMART (Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1999).
113. Id.
114. Eldar Shafir et. al, Reason-Based Choice, 49 COGNITION 11, 36 (1993).
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decision-making is more ad hoc than heuristics in that the criteria are not preset,
but rather involve searching for any criteria that can quickly justify the decision.
Havingjustification(s) in hand for a given decision frees the decision maker from
the necessity of making a more complex deliberative decision. The challenge is
to find the right criteria to justify the decision. Judges need to have the right
criteria in mind to justify their decisions, if they are going to make good
decisions. So, in the context of legislation spelling out the criteria for an ex parte
order of protection, while there are certain criteria established (such as the
requirement of a finding of a "clear and present danger of likely future violence")
what facts pose a "clear and present danger" and present a "danger of likely
future violence" are not typically spelled out in the legislation. In Section IV, we
provide examples from reported cases on how some judges have engaged in
heuristics and reason-based or justification-based decision making that lead to
failing to adequately protect petitioners who have requested ex parte emergency
orders of protection. In Section V, we discuss how to address this problem, and
design shortcuts at the ex parte order stage that take into account the dynamics
of domestic violence, and provide opportunities for the respondent to tender
evidence rebutting the conclusions of these heuristics at the subsequent hearing
that takes place after the respondent is served.
Judges also often rely on gendered stereotypes when making decisions. 115
Petitioners who fit the stereotype of a helpless feminine victim in need of
protection are more likely to win the sympathy of a judge than are petitioners
who are seen as aggressive and assertive. Consistent with this view, analyses of
judicial decisions and interviews with judges have found that many judges
idealize the traditional nuclear, patriarchal family. 116 Women who are too
assertive or otherwise violate notions of traditional passive femininity are at risk
of being blamed for their own victimization or even of being judged as the
aggressors 117 or pathologized. 118 One example of this in many order of protection
statutes, and in some of the cases described in Section IV below, is the focus on
whether the petitioner "fears" the alleged abuser or "fears" further abuse. Fear is
more consistent with feminine than with masculine stereotypes and using this
criterion will cause biases to favor those who fit conventional gendered norms. 119
Judges use criteria such as these, because knowing whether a petitioner fears the
perpetrator can serve as a proxy for more difficult judgments, such as the
likelihood that the perpetrator will commit violence during the period of the
emergency order of protection. But, as explained earlier, under certain
circumstances a petitioner may believe or think they are in danger of further
abuse and in fact be in such danger, but not willing to state that she/he "fears"

115. R.J. COOK & S. CUSACK, GENDER STEREOTYPING: TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES, 78-84 (2010).
116. Diane Crocker, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 2, 197 (2005); Naughton et al.,
supra note 98.
117. Naughton et al., supra note 98, at 356.
118. Id. at 356.
119. Cf Kathleen M. Dillon et al., Sex Roles, Gender, and Fear, 119 THE JOURNAL OF
PSYCHOLOGY 355 (1985).
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the respondent or even "fears" further abuse from the respondent. The
petitioner's judgment is not irrelevant, however, in that the petitioner is in a better
position than strangers to judge whether further abuse is likely to occur.
Consequently, in Section V below, we propose that the wording of order of
protection statutes that require that the petitioners "fear" the respondent or "fear"
further abuse, be amended to instead state that the petitioner "thinks" or
"believes" that the respondent is likely to continue the past pattern of abuse. 120
Temporal and uncertainty discounting, where decision makers under value
the likelihood and severity of future uncertain events 121 could cause some judges
to not fully consider the possibility of future violence in some situations. The
negative effects of granting an order of protection are immediate and certain for
respondents. Respondents will have their freedom of movement immediately
curtailed if an order of protection is granted. 122 By contrast, the negative effects
of denying a request for an order of protection are delayed and uncertain for
petitioners. As discussed in Section IV, this can lead to judges discounting the
likelihood of future abuse. For example, in Cloeter v. Cloeter, 123 discussed in
more detail below, the court denied the petitioner's request for an order of
protection on the grounds that the petitioner failed to provide evidence of the risk
of imminent bodily injury, "at any moment." The fact that violence was not
necessarily immanent and uncertain led the court to underweight the likelihood
of violence and maybe even the severity of the future possible violence. And, to
the contrary, some judges take the view that it is better to be safe than sorry and
deliberately overweight the possibility of violence. 124 Due to the difficulty with
predicting with certainty whether future abuse is likely to occur soon or due to
the order of protection, in Section V, we argue that judges should focus on
whether there has been violence or a pattern of abuse in the past when ruling on
an order of protection. If there has been violence or a pattern of abuse in the past,
then we argue that there should be a presumption (that can be rebutted) that future
imminent abuse is likely and there should be no need to make a further
probability judgment regarding the likelihood of future abuse at the ex parte
order of protection stage.

120. This reform has been proposed by other commentators. See Kohn, supra note 75,
at 739-41 (recommending substituting the word "fear" with the word "believe" or doing
away with this altogether and just having the judge make the determination if the petitioner
is in danger of the type of abuse under the statute that leads to the granting of an order of
protection (danger of imminent bodily harm in most states)).
121. See Sara J. Estle et. al., Differential Effects ofAmount on Temporal and
Probability Discounting of Gains and Losses, 34 MEMORY & COGNITION 914, 914 (2006).
122. See infra Section V. Furthermore, orders of protection could have delayed
negative effects on respondents. For example, the order of protection is something of record
that employers or landlords would learn about because the order of protection will be on the
respondent's permanent record.
123. Cloeter v. Cloeter, 770 N.W.2d 660, 666-67 (Neb. Ct. App. 2009).
124. David N. Heleniak, Erring on the Side of Hidden Harm: The Granting of
Domestic Violence Restraining Orders, 1 PARTNER ABUSE I, 4-5 (2010).
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A CRITIQUE OF How JUDGES HAVE RULED IN ORDER OF PROTECTION
CASES:

In this section, we examine a variety of cases where judges have denied or
granted orders of protection. We start by examining cases where the petitioner
has alleged facts that raise a danger of future violence, but the judge has denied
the order of protection due in large part to: (i) the applicable statutory preconditions and/or (ii) the judge's lack of understanding of the counter-intuitive
aspects of dynamics of domestic violence. We highlight where this lack of
understanding appears to have negatively impacted the judge's findings on
credibility, forecasting of future abuse, and application of the statutory
conditions. To examine why these judicial decisions sometimes differ from
statutory language as well as why statutory language sometimes reads as it does,
this analysis will probe how the cognitive and social psychological phenomena
discussed in section III may have affected how the judges applied the facts
presented to them to the statutory pre-conditions for obtaining an order of
protection. At the end of this section, we note examples where judges have
granted orders of protection based on their better understanding of the dynamics
of domestic violence and/or based on statutes with broader pre-conditions for
obtaining an ex parte order of protection. We also consider in this Section the
situation in Illinois and report on the results from a survey of domestic violence
service organizations in Chicago (and a nearby suburb) on the extent to which
they have observed judges deny ex parte orders of protection based on what we
characterize as the judge created "timing" and "fear" requirements. We critique
these requirements as being inconsistent with the realities of domestic violence,
and in the case of Illinois, inconsistent with the statutory standard for an ex parte
order of protection, and the expressed statutory purposes.
The first case we analyze comes from New Hampshire and illustrates the
impact that the timing of seeking the order of protection can have on obtaining
it. Cases wherein there are delays between when violent acts occur and when
petitioners file for orders of protection are of particular interest, because they
seem to violate many judges' scripts for what constitutes an emergency as well
as how they expect petitioners to act during emergencies, especially when the
court lacks an understanding of the counter-intuitive realities of domestic
violence. In addition, these cases violate many judges' scripts for appropriate
uses of ex parte orders. The plaintiff in Tosta v. Bullis, 125 alleged that the
defendant struck her during an argument on June 18, 2006, causing her to bleed,
that she contacted the police to report the assault, but no charges were filed. She
also stated that they subsequently began divorce proceedings, argued over
custody of their daughter, and that the defendant had driven around her house
and her sister's house saying he had a big, long knife in his car. 126 Had the
plaintiff filed for a protection order the day after the incident, she likely would
have been granted the order since the statement implies a serious threat to use

125. See Tosta v. Bullis, 943 A.2d 824, 826 (N.H. 2008).
126. Id.
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that knife. 127 The plaintiff, however, did not file for a protection order until nine
months after the June 181h events. 128 During that time, she continued to live with
the defendant, with no further violence occurring during that period. 129 What was
happening during those nine months and why she chose to stay after she was
struck and later threatened is not covered in the opinion and likely was not
addressed at the hearing. 13° Consistent with many other cases of domestic
violence, however, the authors speculate that during those nine months the
plaintiff likely tried to mollify her abusive and controlling husband to avert
further abuse, similar to what many survivors of domestic violence do. 131 As
explained in Section Ill above, survivors of domestic violence may at times feel
safer living with their abusive partner than leaving them, so they can mollify
them to prevent violence, or to get a sense of when the next abuse might occur
and how bad it will be. So, this not only may explain why she stayed with her
husband after the abusive acts, but also why she thought that she needed to
petition for an order of protection when he suddenly left without explanation:
leaving with no explanation could be a sign of escalated danger to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff tried to explain to the court why she now felt she needed a protective
order:
"I came this court this week because he left out of the house
the day before and he don't do anything. I was at work and
he just go inside the house. He's go all the stuff without talk
to me, he was going to leave to the house you know. It was
a surprise and I really scared what he thinking, why he wants
to do it. So I know he being violence before and I want to
get be safe me and my childrens, especially my first son."
132

The petitioner stated how surprised and scared she was that her husband
had left the home suddenly with no explanation (i.e. was he planning to do
something terrible to her and her children or leaving for another reason) and how
she could not be safe without a protective order. 133
Untrained in the counter-intuitive aspects of domestic violence, this
description of events violated the sequence of events that the court expected
during an emergency, their cognitive scripts of what constituted an emergency.
The court, perhaps conceptualizing domestic violence as an anger management
problem did not expect violence to erupt from a quiet distance after the abuser
had left the home. They expected that in a true emergency, an abuser would have
more recently lashed out in anger and might still be angry-thereby endangering
the petitioner-when she approached the court. The court was unable to see how

127. This threat, if made just one day earlier, would likely have satisfied the statutory
test of "immediate and present danger of abuse" required in the New Hampshire statute for
obtaining an ex parte order of protection. N.H. S.B. 69 (2013).
128. See Tosta, 943 A.2d at 826.
129. Id. at 826.
130. Id.
131. See infra Section III.
132. Tosta, 943 A.2d at 826-27.
133. Id.

2017]

SEEING THE WRECKING BALL IN MOTION

39

the abusive partner's action of leaving could be a sign of future danger as the
plaintiff did. Applying domestic violence scripts in which abusers engage in
patterns of coercive behavior designed to exercise power and control over
victims, one would readily see how his suddenly leaving could be a sign that he
no longer felt that he was in control. From the perspective of this script, it is easy
to see how he could be planning to engage in even greater, possibly, lethal
violence. Furthermore, because the potential subsequent violence was uncertain
and not necessarily imminent, the court likely discounted the likelihood of
further violence.
The defendant moved to dismiss the petition arguing that it failed to allege
conduct presenting a "credible threat" to plaintiffs safety, emphasizing the ninemonth gap between the assault at issue and the plaintiffs decision to seek a
restraining order. 134 The Supreme Court of New Hampshire denied the plaintiff
a domestic violence protective order. 135 The court noted several facts in denying
the order. First, the court noted that while the plaintiff contacted the police to
report the assault, no charges were filed. 136 Second, in discussing the divorce
proceedings the court stated: "Nevertheless they continued to live together
without any further instances of physical violence until March 2007." 137Most
importantly the court emphasized the nine-month gap period between when the
abusive events occurred and her filing for a protective order and the requirement
for "ongoing" abuse.
"In short, domestic violence protective orders are to be
utilized when a victim has shown a need for protection from
an ongoing credible threat to her safety. Given this statutory
objective, we have required that the threshold misconduct
prompting a domestic violence petition be neither 'too
distant in time' nor 'non-specific.' [citing to prior New
Hampshire cases so ruling]. .. We have also required a
plaintiff to show more than a generalized fear for personal
safety based upon past physical violence and more recent
non-violent harassment to support a finding that a credible
threat to her safety exists." 138
Alarmingly, the requirement that the threshold misconduct prompting the
petition be "neither too distant in time nor non-specific" was one created by the
courts not the legislature, perhaps because they were thinking in terms of anger
management scripts, rather than domestic violence power and control scripts 139
It serves as a decision-making shortcut to justify the decision or as a criterion in
a heuristic, but it is inconsistent with the realities of domestic violence, and
inconsistent in the case ofNew Hampshire, with the statutory language directing

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 826-28.
Id. at 829.
Id.
Id. at 826.
Tosta, 943 A.2d at 828-29.
Id. at 829.

40

WISCONSIN JOURNAL OF LAW, GENDER & SOCIETY

[Vol.32:1

courts to consider evidence of acts "regardless of their proximity in time to the
filing of the petition." 140
Tosta thus reflects how a court untrained in the counter-intuitive aspects of
domestic violence can fail to see the "ongoing credible threat," when such a
threat does in fact exist (i.e., failing to see the wrecking ball in motion and the
looming danger of future violence). The case also underscores the problem with
the statutory standard requiring a "credible present threat to the plaintiff's safety"
when the plaintiff who seeks an order of protection 141 has failed to seek this
remedy immediately or very soon after an act of abuse. This is so even when the
statute also states: "The court may consider evidence of such acts regardless of
their proximity in time to the filing of the petition, which in combination with
recent conduct, reflects an ongoing pattern of behavior which reasonably causes
or has caused the petitioner to fear for his or her safety or well-being. [emphasis
added]. " 142 Without a deep understanding of the dynamics of domestic violence
a court is likely to apply scripts and expectations that are inappropriate to
domestic violence cases, such as scripts for individuals with anger management
problems. Perhaps due to temporal and uncertainty 143 discounting and their
failure to understand the patterns of power, control, and violence that occur in
domestic violence situations, courts will have a tendency to discount the very
real possibility of subsequent violence, especially after a delay. Finally, courts
will take decision-making short-cuts to justify their decisions and use heuristics
in interpreting statutory language such as conflating "present" threat to the
plaintiff's safety with present acts of violence.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court in Fillmore v. Fillmore, 144 also
affirmed the denial of an order of protection, and, as will be explained, their
decision contained certain dicta that is very problematic. In Fillmore, the plaintiff
alleged that her husband had struck her in anger eleven years ago, and had pushed
her into a slide during an argument that took place eight years ago. She also
testified that he made a recent threat to "make her life a living hell" causing her
to fear that her husband, the defendant, might become violent again. 145 The New
Hampshire Supreme Court ruled that these incidents were too distant in time and
non-specific to rise to the level of misconduct required for an ex parte domestic
violence protective order. 146 Without presenting evidence of a pattern of abuse to
140. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 173-B (WEST 2017).
141. Even after notice to the defendant.
142. N.H. Rev. Stat.§ 173-B (2017).
143. The negative effects of orders of protection on respondents are immediate and
certain, if granted. Respondents have their freedom of movement limited immediately. By
contrast, the beneficial effects of orders of protection on petitioners are delayed and
uncertain. Violence may come later, perhaps, or never at all. Thus, the effects of temporal
and probability discounting, well-studied by judgment and decision-making researchers, are
likely to operate when judges make decisions regarding orders of protection; S.J. Estle, L.
Green, J. Myerson, D.D. Holt, Differential Effects ofAmount on Temporal and Probability
Discounting of Gains and Losses, 34 MEMORY & COGNITJON 914-928 (2006).
144. Fillmore v. Fillmore, 786 A.2d 849 (N.H. 2001).
145. Id. at 850.
146. Id. at 851.
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exercise coercive control, and what appears to be a lack of any form of abuse for
over eight years after the past violence, it could be that this past violence was
more of an anger management problem than domestic violence. The court,
therefore, may have been correct that future violence was unlikely to occur. On
the other hand, the petitioner had appeared to have angered the respondent
recently, leading to the threat to "make her life a living hell," which might in fact
lead to future violence based on the prior acts of violence reflecting what appears
to be an anger management problem. 147 More facts would need to be known to
better analyze the question of the likelihood of future violence. Having said that,
we focus on the Fillmore case due to the problematic dicta in the case.
The court in Fillmore stated that the fact that the defendant was away in
Canada when the plaintiff sought the protective order was a factor in the court's
decision that she was not in immediate and present danger of abuse. 148 This
would be problematic if there was a pattern of abusive control in this case,
because this time and distance provides a rare opportunity for survivors to take
steps to escape the abuse, including obtaining an order of protection. The court's
dicta, if it were to become a well-known practice, could discourage survivors of
domestic violence from timing their seeking of an order of protection in a safe
maner. Survivors of domestic violence should be able to time their seeking of
legal protection to when they are safer to seek this protection, such as while the
abusive partner is temporarily away, and not be penalized for doing so. If there
was a pattern of coercive abuse, or even of an anger management problem, the
fact that the plaintiff sought the protective order while the defendant was
temporarily away more likely evidences the fear the plaintiff felt, rather than
serving as evidence that there was no immediate and present danger of abuse.
The court also likely misinterpreted the plaintiffs request in her petition that her
husband be allowed to contact her at reasonable times to discuss child visitation
and marriage counseling. The court took this request as evidence that the plaintiff
must not have really considered herself to be in immediate and present danger of
abuse needing a protective order. This dictum problematically evidences a lack
of the cognitive scripts necessary to understand the dynamics of domestic
violence, because there are many other reasons why a survivor of domestic
violence might seek continuing contacts with an abusive intimate partner,
especially relating to the children they share. These reasons can persist, even if
she needs an order to prohibit all other contacts. First, she may have sought this
exception to mollify her husband and stay safe. Second, she may have truly
thought that he was a good father even if she feared further abuse from him.
Finally, she may have been advised to do this so that in a divorce case she would
not be perceived as an alienating parent. Instead of examining whether there had
been a pattern of various forms of abuse, the court focused on certain facts in a
way that did not take into account the complex dynamics of domestic violence.
In addition, from the perspective of traditional, non-domestic violence ex parte
orders described in Section I, the physical absence of the defendant would likely
147. We lack information on ifthere was a pattern of non-violent, but coercive, abuse
here which is helpful in forecasting future violence.
148. Fillmore, 786 A.2d at 850.
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be construed as negating a finding of a current emergency, justifying the denial
of the requested order of protection.
The Nebraska Court of Appeals decision in Ditmars v. Ditmars, 149 provides
an example of a court denying an order of protection due to a combination of a
narrow definition of abuse in Nebraska's statute and a judicial interpretation of
the statute that creates an even stricter requirement, making it even more difficult
for petitioners, who are in danger of significant future abuse, to successfully
obtain ex parte protection orders.
The petitioner in Ditmars alleged among other things that her husband
would threaten her if she refused to have sex with him, would insist that she and
her son go shooting with him and when she refused and stayed in the home, he
pretended to shoot at the house and laugh, he monitored her phone usage all the
time, kept her isolated in a rural area (she and her 12-year-old son were
immigrants from Ukraine) and would spin out on dirt roads when the three were
traveling together in the car. 150 Put together, these behaviors constitute a pattern
of abusive behavior motived by a desire to obtain and maintain power and
control. The district court granted her an ex parte protection order finding she
had stated facts showing that the respondent had attempted to cause bodily injury
to her and her son by "physical menace," placing them in fear of imminent bodily
injury (the statutory language in Nebraska). 151 But the Nebraska Court of
Appeals reversed, noting that this statutory language was recently interpreted to
require a showing that bodily injury is likely to occur "at any moment." 152The
fact that in their view it was theoretically possible that the abuse might have
already ended and that subsequent abuse was uncertain may have caused the
court to discount the likelihood of subsequent abuse despite the previous pattern
of abuse, demonstrating uncertainty discounting on the part of the court.
Furthermore, as in the cases above, the court demonstrated their lack of the
cognitive scripts necessary to understand the dynamics of domestic violence by
noting that the petitioner waited months after these incidents ( six months from
the first incidents alleged and two months after the latter incidents alleged) before
filing for the protection order. The Nebraska Court of Appeals ruled that the
incidents alleged were too remote in time to support entry of a protection order. 153
The Court of Appeals also noted as reasons or justifications for their decision not
to grant the ex parte order of protection that the petitioner and her son had already
moved away from the respondent's home, that there was no recent contact, and
she was planning a divorce. 154 The court's reaction may have been appropriate,
if counterfactually the abuse were due to an anger management problem, but this
pattern of abuse is not consistent with anger management scripts. Rather this
pattern of abuse is consistent with domestic violence scripts under which the
abuse is used for purposes of attaining and maintaining power and control. As
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Ditmars v. Ditmars, 788 N.W.2d 817 (Neb. Ct. App. 2010).
Id. at 819.
Id. at 820.
Id. at 820-21.
Id.
Id.
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such, courts need to have the cognitive scripts necessary to understand the
dynamics of domestic violence, apply that understanding to cases such as this
one, and not impose timing requirements that are inappropriate for this type of
abuse.
The Nebraska court case establishing the judicial requirement of bodily
injury likely to occur "at any moment" was the Cloeter v. Cloeter case, 155 where
the respondent sent text messages to the petitioner that combined spelled out the
word "behead" and had placed boards on the petitioner's driveway (two years
earlier the respondent had threatened to beat her with a board). The court ruled
these actions did not constitute evidence of fear of imminent bodily injury
because there was no evidence the respondent was there when the petitioner saw
this, so bodily injury was not shown to occur "at any moment" as contrasted with
another case where the respondent was holding a pitchfork at the time he
threatened the petitioner with bodily injury (see the Contreras v. Contreras
case 156). As in Ditmars, this case demonstrates that the court lacked the cognitive
scripts necessary to understand the dynamics of domestic violence. The fact that
violence was uncertain in these cases may have triggered the phenomenon of
uncertainty discounting, which can cause the court to discount the likelihood of
future violence.
The Supreme Court ofNorth Dakota also engaged in a strict reading of what ·
satisfies the statutory requirement of "fear of an imminent harm" as a precondition to issue an order of protection. In Ficklin v. Ficklin, 157 the
respondent had threatened that he would bum the house down if he did not get
to keep it. The petitioner also alleged that he treated her like a child, had been
verbally abusive and had hit her. The court ruled that having a perceived threat
of domestic violence does not constitute a reasonable fear of actual or imminent
harm as required by the statute. 158 Focusing on the word "would" in his threat
that he would bum it down if he did not get to keep it, the court saw the
subsequent violence as uncertain and, therefore, discounted the likelihood of
imminent harm in the form of subsequent violence. 159 The trial court found that
the husband represented a credible threat to the safety of the petitioner and
children living with her and that if he goes home, based on the conduct of both
parties (she had struck him as well) "there is a danger of domestic violence." 160
The Supreme Court of North Dakota rejected this reasoning: "Rather than basing
the order on fear of imminent harm, the court's focus appears to be the
elimination of the possibility of harm by removing the respondent form the
home." 161 The court also noted that the petitioner stayed in the home after the
respondent made the threat and did not attempt to leave as part of the reason for

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Cloeter v. Cloeter, 770 N.W.2d 660 (Neb. Ct. App. 2009).
Contreras v. Contreras, No. A-09-871, 2010 Neb. App. LEXIS 36, at *13-14.
Ficklin v. Ficklin, 710 N.W. 2d 387 (N.D. 2006).
Id. at 392.
Id.
Id. at 389.
Id. at 390.
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their conclusion that the petitioner did not fear imminent harm. 162This conclusion
reflects a lack of understanding of the dynamics of domestic violence and its
impact on survivors described in Section III.
The Supreme Court ofNorth Dakota contrasted the facts in Ficklin with the
facts in the Locik. In Locik, the petitioner alleged that the respondent had choked
the petitioner while holding a baby, pushed petitioner to the ground, pushed her
against the wall and had made several angry and threatening phone calls. 163 The
court agreed that those facts create a reasonable fear of imminent physical
harm. 164 The Supreme Court of North Dakota then reasoned that Ficklin before
them was analogous to the Lawrence v. Delkamp case where there were serious
and reprehensible threats (to "beat the crap out of the mother" and a threat to
"eliminate" the son in a boating accident and "not see her son again") but no
finding of physical violence or fear of immediate or soon to be inflicted physical
harm, "Because the threats were of future conduct, even though the remarks were
'serious and reprehensible' we held that the court was clearly erroneous when it
determined that the threats could be defined as actual or imminent domestic
violence. " 165 This hyper-technical judicial interpretation of the statutory
requirement of "imminent physical harm "reflects a callous disregard for the
safety of those seeking orders of protection. Furthermore, had the North Dakota
statute not so narrowly defined the type of abuse that can serve as the basis for
an order of protection (i.e. not recognizing forms of abuse beyond physical
violence), the outrageous and emotionally harmful acts of abuse described in
Ditmars, Cloeter, Ficklin, and Lawrence should have led to the granting of orders
of protection in their own right (to cause a cessation of the acts of harassment
and interference with personal liberty) 166 and based on the possible escalation of
violence they portended.
The Missouri Appellate Court decision in M.D.L. v. S.C.E., 167 provides an
example of how some courts-lacking the cognitive scripts to understand the
dynamics of domestic violence--discount a long history of abuse and physical
violence when the last act of serious abuse has occurred months or years before.
Instead of looking at the long history and pattern of abuse as the basis for the
statutorily required showing of subjective and reasonable fear of future harm
from the person committing the abuse, the court looked at whether the petitioner
demonstrated fear of the abused as a heuristic or shortcut for their decision
making. The case is also informative for expressly raising a concern that other
courts might be influenced by, but rarely explicitly raise, the stigma to the
defendant if the order is granted. This concern likely served as an important

I 62. Id. at 391.
163. Ficklin v. Ficklin, 710 N.W. 2d 387, 391-92 (N.D. 201 I).
164. Id.
165. Id. At 392.
166. See 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 60/103. The facts in each of these three cases (if alleged
by a petitioner seen as credible) would have led to the issuance of an ex parte order of
protection under the more expansive law in Illinois of what constitutes "abuse" that serve as
a precondition for an order of protection.
167. M.D.L. v. S.C.E., 391 S.W. 3d 525,(Mo. Ct. App. 2013).
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reason for the decision, and may explain why some courts, as noted above,
engage in an overly technical and narrow interpretation of their order of
protection statutes as the basis to deny an order of protection when the judge fails
to see the looming danger of violence.
The plaintiff in M.D.L. testified to a large number of incidents of abuse. The
most recent acts of abuse were that the defendant had drugged her and slashed
her boyfriend's tires while his car was parked in her driveway. 168 The plaintiff
was currently seeking an order of protection based on "stalking" defined as
"purposely and repeatedly engaging in an unwanted course of conduct that
causes alarm to another person, when it is reasonable in that person's situation
to have been alarmed by the conduct." 169
The plaintiff also testified to many other prior acts of abuse that were
physical in nature that took place eight months earlier: defendant had punched
her in the face, pulled a gun on her, tried to run her off the road, kicked her, hit
her, and given her a black eye; she also testified that even earlier than that he had
held her down by the neck and head while telling her he was going to kill her. 170
She also testified that occasionally he deserted her without any transportation
and locked her out of the home in the cold. 171
The statute in Missouri requires for an order of protection based on
stalking 172 a showing of subjective fear of physical harm (when there has been
no prior physical violence) and must show that a reasonable person under the
same circumstances also would have feared physical harm. 173 Applying this law
to the facts, the Court of Appeals reversed the stalking order of protection. 174 The
court noted that the defendant had not threatened the plaintiff with physical harm
in the eight months prior to seeking the stalking order of protection. 175 The court
then found that the plaintiff had failed to testify as to why she feared physical
harm in response to any specific actions taken by her former boyfriend. Instead,
the plaintiff testified that she was always in fear of her safety with the defendant
based on the numerous acts of violence he had engaged in years earlier. The court
responded to this by stating "We acknowledge Respondent's [the plaintiff] wide
range of testimony listing Appellant's [the defendant] untoward conduct.
However, we find dispositive the absence of testimony from Respondent or any
other witness that Appellant's conduct caused her to fear physical harm." 176
It is stunning that the Missouri Court of Appeals did not find that the recent
coercively abusive acts of the defendant (drugging the plaintiff and slashing the
tires of her boyfriend's car while parked in her driveway) were the basis for the
168. Id. at 531.
169. Id. at 529.
170. Id. at 528.
171. Id.
172. Plaintiff had earlier received a full order of protection against defendant.
Defendant appeals the automatic renewal of the protection order and challenges that there
was substantial evidence to support a finding of stalking.
173. M.D.L.. 391 S.W.3d at 529.
174. Id. at 530.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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petitioner to have a real and reasonable fear of future physical violence from the
defendant, especially in light of the horrific, prior physical violence, and deadly
threats by the defendant against the plaintiff. This pattern of abuse is consistent
with a desire to coercively control an intimate partner and raises a significant
danger not only of further abuse, but also of an escalation of the abuse. In
explaining the court's hyper-technical requirement that the plaintiff testify as to
precisely which conduct caused the plaintiff to fear future physical violence from
the defendant, the court, candidly, noted the court's need to "exercise great care
to ensure that sufficient evidence exists to support all elements of the statute
before entering a full order of protection" due to the stigma that may attach to a
person who is labeled a "stalker. " 177 It appears from this confession that the judge
was more concerned with and focused on the harm to the defendant's reputation
from issuing a stalking order than with considering how the facts alleged did in
fact create a real and reasonable fear of future violence and the importance of
focusing on the entire pattern of abuse rather than isolate each instance. We
wonder how often judges consider (without saying so) the stigma to the
respondent from granting an order of protection, when applying the statutory
requirements, even when the statutory language does not call for courts to
consider that factor when deciding whether to grant an order of protection.
The forgoing review of reported appellate court decisions illustrate the
various reasons why judges sometimes fail to see the wrecking ball in motion
and deny ex parte orders of protection that they should have granted.
Conversely, we next report on examples of cases where: (i) the courts
demonstrated an understanding of the dynamics of domestic violence, saw the
looming danger of further abuse and violence even when a violent act had not
recently taken place, and granted the ex parte order of protection sought and/or
(ii) where the statutory preconditions better enabled the courts to grant an ex
parte order of protection by only requiring that violence "may occur" in the future
(versus that the future violence was "imminent" or in the "near" future).
In Lewis v. Lewis, 178 the wife petitioned for a protective order against her
husband. The lower court dismissed her petition finding she failed to establish
that her husband committed a "reasonably recent" act of family violence against
her. The Court of Appeals held that the Georgia statute does not absolutely
require a petitioner to show a "relatively recent" act of family violence; the
statute only requires a showing that family violence "has occurred in the past and
may occur in the future." 179 This court noted that while the "recency" of past
violence may bear upon the likelihood of future violence, there may be a good
reason in some cases to believe that past violence, although fairly remote, is now

l 77. Id.
178. Lewis v. Lewis, 728 S.E.2d 742 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).
179. Id. at 70. The court noted in footnote 3 to the opinion: "It appears that the court
below found the 'reasonably recent' requirement in a form order that then was used widely
in Gwinnett County in cases involving OCGA Section 19-13-3. The form, unlike the statute,
purports to require the petitioner to show a 'reasonably recent' act of family violence. The
form also erroneously requires a petitioner to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that an act
of family violence 'may occur in the near future.' [Emphasis supplied]"
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likely to recur. 180 As an example, the court noted the situation where someone
has been gone far away for a long time but now has returned. In ruling on the
matter, the Georgia Court of Appeals highlighted the following facts in this
case. 181 The parties had married in 2007 and separated in 2010. The marriage was
marked by harassment, threats, and violence by the husband against the wife
according to the court of appeals. 182 The wife tried to hide from the husband
several times but he would find her and harass and threaten her. 183 In October
2010 he assaulted her and drove off with her car and the children. 184 A warrant
for his arrest was issued and he ended up agreeing to stay away and not contact
her except on visits with the children. But he moved back to Georgia in March
2011 and on July 18 1h he came to her home enraged because he had been served
with a lawsuit for child support. 185 Of most interest for our line of inquiry, the
Court of Appeals placed weight on the wife's testimony that based on her past
experience with her ex-husband she feared that he was about to become
physically violent toward her, mostly "because of the look on his face and his
demeanor" and the comments he made to her about his child support payments
to another woman, and that she believed this violence would happen if and when
he was ordered to pay child support. 186 Based on this belief, on July 20 1h she
applied for an ex parte temporary protective order. 187
Some judges lacking the cognitive scripts necessary to understand domestic
violence would not have seen the looming danger based on: (i) violence and
abuse that took place five months earlier, (ii) the only recent acts being the "look
on" the respondent's face, the respondent's "demeanor" and comments that the
respondent made about his child support payments to another woman, and (iii)
the assertion by the petitioner that she believed the respondent will attack her
physically if and when he is ordered to pay child support. Consider, for example,,
the court in Tosta, 188 which did not put weight on a petitioner's testimony of fear
based upon what might be considered ambiguous events. But because the court
understood domestic violence and looked for the patterns of behavior seen in
domestic violence scripts it did see the looming danger. The court understood the
importance of placing weight on the history of abusive conduct and recognized
the abuse as taking place in a pattern versus as a series of isolated incidents. It
also helped here that the statutory language in Georgia merely required prior
family violence and that future violence "may occur" versus that a recent act of
violence has occurred and that future violence is imminent. We will discuss
which criteria and the optimal number of criteria given constraints on judges'

180.
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182.
183.
184.
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Id. at 743-44.
/d.at742-43.
Id.
Id.
Lewis, 728 S.E.2d at 742-43.
Id. at 742.
Id.
Id.

Tosta v. Bullis, 943 A.2d 824, 829 (N.H. 2008).
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working memory capacity necessary for deciding ex parte order of protection in
Section V.
The trial court granted, and the Indiana Court of Appeals, affirmed the
granting of a protective order in Cunningham v. Rains. 189 The Respondent argued
that the petitioner failed to show that respondent was a "credible threat" to her
because she did not file her petition for a protective order when he first threatened
her so she must not have found his threats credible. 190 The trial court and the
appellate court rejected this argument. The Court of Appeals cited to the statute
which directs a court not to deny a protective order "solely because of a lapse of
time between an act of domestic or family violence and the filing of a petition." 191
Although the Court of Appeals acknowledged that this lapse of time can be
considered, the court also noted that the petitioner had filed a police report after
the initial threat. Perhaps equally important, the nature of the threats in this case
were so extreme, 192 that it did not take a special knowledge of domestic violence
scripts to find a credible threat in this case.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court, In the Matter of Sm-ryer, 193 held that
the complainant's allegations raised a reasonable inference that she was in
immediate danger of domestic abuse even though there was a nine-month delay
between when the defendant had been physically violent towards her and when
she sought the protective order, and a nine-day delay between when the
defendant had followed her while armed, and her seeking the protective order.
The defendant claimed that complainant had failed to show she was in immediate
and present danger justifying the issuance of a temporary protective order due to
this nine month and nine-day delay. 194 The defendant cited to Fillmore and Tosta
where the court imposed a requirement that the incidents serving as the basis for
the protective order not be too distant in time and be specific. 195 The Supreme
Court disagreed with the defendant, distinguishing the facts in this case from
those in Fillmore. The court pointed to a delay of only nine months in Sawyer
versus a delay of years in Fillmore from when the defendant had struck and
strangled the plaintiff, and a delay of only nine days from when the defendant
had followed the plaintiff around while armed as the most recent event in Sawyer
versus the insufficient evidence of any recent abuse by the defendant in Tosta. 196

189. Cunningham v. Rains, 948 N.E. 2d 868 (Ct. App. Ind. 201 I) (Memorandum
Decision-Not for Publication).
190. id.
191. Ind. Code Ann.§ 34-26-5-13 (West2017).
192. The respondent threatened to get someone to rape the petitioner; that he would
throw acid in her face, would run her over with a truck, that he would cause her to lose her
job, and that he would slice her head open with a machete. 948 N.E. 2d 868.
193. In Re Sawyer, 8A.3d 80 (N.H. 2010).
194. id. at 83-84.
195. id.
196. The court distinguished the Tosta case, where the precipitating event was the
defendant's leaving the home without explanation, versus here where the armed defendant
nine days earlier followed the plaintiff and the plaintiff's statement that the defendant needs
medical attention and would not get help, finding the latter constituted abuse warranting a
protective order, but not the former. id. at 84.
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Without overruling the judicially created requirement that the last incident of
misconduct justifying the protective order be not too distant in time to when the
plaintiff files for the protective order, 197 the court still ruled that the incidents that
occurred nine months and nine days earlier, "permit one to reasonably infer
plaintiff at risk of further abuse and that plaintiff was in "immediate danger of
abuse by the defendant" justifying the issuance of a temporary protective
order. 198
We conclude our review of case law on orders of protection with the State
of Illinois due to the enigma it presents and the policy implications from this.
Similar to the courts in New Hampshire, some trial courts in Illinois have been
observed to impose a requirement that the most recent act of abuse occur not too
distant in time from when the petitioner sought the order of protection, 199 even
though there is no such requirement in the statutory language. And, there is no
Illinois Supreme Court decision sanctioning this interpretation of the Illinois
Domestic Violence Act as the New Hampshire Supreme Court has. Nevertheless,
trial court judges in Illinois have been observed to ask, "where is the
emergency?" when the most recent act of abuse took place more than a week
before the petitioner has come into court and then deny an ex parte order of
protection in those cases due to this delay. The first author sent a survey in March
of 2013 to 27 organizations located in Chicago, Illinois, and a nearby suburb;
who represent or otherwise assist survivors of domestic violence (the "Service
Provider Survey"). 200 The purpose of the survey was to gain a sense of how
domestic violence advocates and attorneys assess judicial application of the
Illinois Domestic Violence Act ("IDV A") in granting ex parte orders of
protection, and to explore their experience with some potential problem areas.
Nine organizations filled in and returned the surveys. Question 3 of the survey.
asked if they ever observed a judge state that she/he would not grant an
emergency order of protection because the last incident of abuse took place "too
long ago" in the court's judgment, and if yes, how many times they observed this
happen. Eight of the nine organizations reported observing this and 1 reported
they did not observe this. Of the eight that observed this, one reported "countless"
times, one reported "not know the number of times," one reported that over the
past month, four times, one reported twenty-four times, three reported between
three-five times and one did not specify how many times. 201
This was the case even though the statutory standard for an ex parte order
of protection in Illinois does not require a showing of an "immediate and present
danger of future violence" and instead requires issuing an ex parte order when
the giving of notice would likely lead to the harm that the petitioner was trying

197. Id. at 83-84. The court did decline, however, to read a requirement into the
relevant statutory scheme that plaintiffs seeking a temporary protective order must set forth
the specific dates upon which he or she allegedly suffered abuse.
198. Id.
199. See Stark, supra note 9.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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to avoid through seeking the order ofprotection. 202 As Section 217 of the IDVA
states:
"An emergency order of protection shall issue if
petitioner satisfies the requirements of this subsection for
one or more of the requested remedies. For each remedy
requested, petitioner shall establish that: 1. [reference to
jurisdiction]; 2. [reference to the requirements in Section
214 describing the 18 remedies]; and 3. There is a good
cause to grant the remedy regardless of prior service of
process or of notice upon the respondent because: (i) For the
remedies of[identified 214(b) 1,3,8,9,11,14,15, and 16], the
harm which that remedy is intended to prevent would be
likely to occur if the respondent were given any prior notice,
or greater notice than was actually given, of the petitioner's
effort to obtain judicial relief. " 203
In addition, Section 214(c) of the IDVA states, consistent with the cycle of
violence, and problem of separation assault, the following are relevant factors in
determining whether to grant the remedies sought through an order of protection:
"(i) the nature, frequency, severity, pattern, and consequences of the
respondent's past abuse ... and the likelihood of danger of future abuse ... " 204
These factors are in keeping with the dynamics of domestic violence, by
considering the nature and pattern of abuse that has taken place in determining
whether to grant the remedies sought in the petition for an order ofprotection. 205
And while the IDVA refers as noted above to the "likelihood of danger of future
abuse" as a relevant factor, 206 neither of these sections state that the likelihood of
future abuse must be "imminent" or a "clear and present danger" as most other
order of protection statutes do. 207 So, it is an enigma as to why some trial courts
202. 750 ILL COMP. STAT. 60/217. This language focuses on how providing notice to
the respondent that the petitioner is seeking an order of protection can itself make it likely
that the respondent will in reaction harm the petitioner, and should logically also encompass,
but not require, the situation where there is an immediate likelihood of future abuse even
without the seeking of an order of protection.
203. Id.
204. 750 Ill. ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214.
205. Compare 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214 with The Cycle of Domestic Violence,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ROUNDTABLE (2016)
http://www.domesticviolenceroundtable.org/dvcycle, and Power and Control Wheel, THE
DULUTH MODEL (2011), http://www.theduluthmodel.org/pdf/PowerandControl.pdf.
206. And in Section 214 (c)(3)(ii) focuses on whether the respondent's conduct or
actions "unless prohibited will likely cause irreparable harm or continued abuse." 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN.60/214.
207. It should be noted, however, that certain of the remedies potentially available
with an order of protection in Illinois, such as the remedy of"exclusive possession of the
residence" require additional elements, such as a balancing of the hardships to the petitioner
and the respondent from granting or not granting the remedy, which includes considering
whether there is an "immediate danger of further abuse." But these additional requirements
are not required for many other remedies such as an order prohibiting further abuse, or an
order to stay away from the petitioner (although there is a balancing of hardship test required
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in Illinois place so much emphasis on when the last act of abuse has occurred,
de-emphasize the prior pattern of abuse, and deny orders of protection based on
a judicially created "timing" requirement. We hypothesized that the trial courts
might have been following scripts for ex parte orders in non-domestic violence
domains (which normally require a showing of an immediate and present danger
of irreparable harm) and were also struggling to deal with the complexity of
determining the likelihood of future abuse, which requires a sophisticated
understanding of domestic violence, and used a simple heuristic (requiring that
the last act of serious abuse had happened recently) to make that decision making
easier.
A further enigma is why some trial courts in Illinois require the petitioner
to state that she "feared" the respondent or "fears" future abuse, even though the
Illinois Domestic Violence Act statutory language does not refer to "fear" as a
precondition to obtain an order of protection. 208 The IDV A authorizes the
granting of an ex parte order of protection based on a judgment by the court that
the conduct or actions of the respondent, unless prohibited, will likely cause
irreparable harm "or continued abuse."209 Abuse under the Illinois statute is
broadly defined to include not only physical violence but also many other forms
of abuse, including "Harassment" which is defined as causing severe emotional
distress by conduct calculated to cause such distress that has no legitimate.
purpose and includes things like repeatedly calling someone at work or otherwise
contacting a person after being told not to do so. 210 In cases of harassment such
as repeatedly calling someone at work, a person might not yet "fear" the
respondent even though the abuse might escalate in the future without the order
of protection. And even when a petitioner has experienced physical abuse at the
hands of the respondent, there are many reasons why some petitioners may be
reluctant to say she is in fear of the respondent. First, a survivor may be in denial
of the degree of danger she faces from her intimate partner. Second, a petitioner
(especially if male) may be ashamed or too proud to admit that she/he fears the
respondent. Some survivors (especially if seeking the order of protection on their
own without any legal assistance) may be confused as to why they are being
asked if they are afraid of the respondent, when they may have been told by
friends "don't be afraid, go get help." The proper question of the petitioner in
Illinois should be whether the petitioner "thinks" or "believes" that the
respondent is likely to abuse her/him if he/she learns that she/he is seeking an
order or protection. It would also be appropriate for the petitioner to state she/he
"fears" this future abuse when that is the case, but the failure to state the

for stay away orders when a respondent is being ordered to stay away from areas where the
petitioner would otherwise have a right to be at such as a school the respondent attends or a
church the respondent is a member of). 750 ILL COMP. STAT. 60/217.
208. As contrasted with states like North Dakota, whose legislation requires a "fear of
an imminent harm" as a precondition for an order of protection when there has not been prior
physical harm, bodily injury, or sexual activity compelled by physical force.
N.D.CENT.CODE § 14-07.1-01(2).
209. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/ 214(c)(3)(ii).
210. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/103(7).
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petitioner feels "fear" of the future abuse should not be the basis to deny an ex
parte order of protection under the language in the statute.
Nevertheless, trial courts in Cook County, Illinois have been observed to
routinely ask the petitioner if she fears the respondent or fears further abuse from
the respondent. And denying an order of protection when the petitioner fails to
so testify. Question 5 of the Service Provider Survey asks if the organization ever
observed a judge deny an emergency order of protection because the judge asked
the petitioner if she "feared" the "petitioner" [a typo it should have said
"respondent"] and the petitioner said "no" and if so, how many times. Four of
the organizations reported "yes" (responding: one time, seven times, "a couple
times", and ten times), three responded "no," and two left the question blank
(perhaps because of the typo). 211 In addition, certain forms posted on the Cook
County, Illinois website also include questions asking the petitioner whether
she/he fears the respondent and fears further abuse if an ex parte order is not
issued. 212
In trying to understand these two puzzles, and check if our hypotheses were
correct, we researched for reported Illinois Appellate Court and Illinois Supreme
Court decisions that involved ex parte orders of protection to see if any of them
shed light on where the judicially created requirements might have come from.
In particular, we looked at "timing" requirements (including the "where is the
emergency?" question)--which we hypothesized might be due to inappropriately
applying ex parte scripts from non-domestic violence domains (for example, the
wrecking ball about to demolish a building or confidential information about to
be released) and the "fear" requirement-which might be a proxy and short-cut
for determining the likelihood of further abuse and follows gendered scripts of
how a survivor of domestic violence would react to dangerous abuse. 213 We
found some insights on the first puzzle in the Illinois Appellate Court decision in
Sanders v. Shepard, 214 an early case applying and interpreting the IDVA. The
court in Sanders referred to the general laws on ex parte orders in analyzing
whether the ex parte orders of protection under the IDVA were Constitutional. 215
Perhaps because of that, the court in Sanders used the phrase "exigent
circumstances" when referring to the standard for an ex parte order of protection

2 I I. See, supra note 203 and accompanying text.
212. See, CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE DIVISION, ORDER OF
PROTECTION PRO BONO REPRESENTATION, MODEL SCRIPT FOR EMERGENCY ORDERS OF
PROTECTION 42-44 available at
https://www.illinoislegalaid.org/sites/default/files/attachments/Order%20of"/o20protection%
20pro%20bono%20representation.pdf.
213. Id.
214. Sanders v. Shephard, 541 N.E. 2d 1150 (Ill App Ct 1st Dist. 1989) (respondent
alleged to have concealed the petitioner's child and petitioner sought an ex parte order of
protection for child's return; petitioner argued that prior notice likely lead to the child being
further concealed and the destruction of evidence of the whereabouts of the child and
respondent argued, among other things, in challenge of the trial court's granting of the ex
parte order of protection that the IDVA's ex parte order deprived the respondent of due
process oflaw).
215. ld.atll55.
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under the IDVA, (even though the phrase "exigent circumstances" is not used in
the IDVA). The court then cited to the full statutory language for an ex parte
order of protection, and thus, it appears that the phrase "exigent circumstances"
was not intended to create a new requirement but just a shorthand for the lengthy
statutory language. 216 Yet, courts thereafter may have been influenced by the
dicta in Sanders where the court referred to "exigent circumstances" and
discussed case law from ex parte orders in other contexts, and may have been
influenced to follow those scripts, especially when they had not received
extensive training on the dynamics of domestic violence such as the phenomenon
of "separation assault." As for the requirement that some trial court judges
impose, that the petitioner testify that she "fears" the respondent or "fears" that
further abuse will occur to obtain an ex parte order of protection, there is no clue
from the reported cases on where that practice developed. But the practice is
evidenced not only by the Survey of Lawyers and Advocates, but also by the fact
that certain practice forms posted on the Cook County Court webpage contains
that language. 217 The presence of fear can serve as a reasonable shorthand or
heuristic to assess the degree of danger that a petitioner may be in. The petitioner
is in a better position to assess the degree of danger than anyone else and, ifthere
is a high degree of danger, it would be expected that a petitioner would likely
fear the defendant. However, because being fearful is inconsistent with
masculine gender norms, consistent with feminine gender norms, and is also
associated with weakness,218 petitioners will differ in the degree to which they
are willing to admit that they "fear" the defendant. An alternative shorthand or
heuristic that avoids these problems would be to look to whether petitioners
"think" or "believe" that they are in danger.
We also hypothesize that these two requirements were imposed because
courts need easily applied decision-making criteria when considering complex
factors that need to be applied: heuristics and "reason-based" decision making.
Judges have limited cognitive resources to expend when making decisions
regarding ex parte orders of protection. They do not have a lot of time to devote
to studying each case that comes before them nor do they have expertise on
assessing the likelihood of further abuse as these assessments are very
complicated. To get a sense of how complicated this assessment is, consider that
a research group found twenty-three significant psychological and social factors
that judges would need to consider to evaluate the likelihood of further abuse. 219
Judges do not have the time, cognitive resources, or multiple forms of expertise
to consider all of these factors at the emergency order stage and, in fact, the group
216. While the caption for the ex parte order section of the IDVA is labelled
"Emergency order of protection", there is no reference in the substance of the text of this
section that an "emergency" must exist for an ex parte order of protection to be granted.
217. Seesupranote212at25,36.
218. Dillon, supra note 119 at 355-58.
219. Mary Ballou, et al. Initial Development of a Psychological Model for Judicial
Decision Making in Continuing Restraining Orders, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 283 (2007). Note that
in these authors' estimation this list of factors was too complicated for the emergency order
stage and they only proposed these factors for careful consideration in contested hearings
over continuations of orders of protection. The research group noted in the text included the
following professionals: psychologists, neuro psychologists, clinicians, and judges.
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of researchers only proposed considering these factors in contested hearings over
continuations of orders of protection. Without well-designed easily applied
decision-making criteria, judges who have not been extensively trained on the
dynamics of domestic violence are particularly likely to rely on ill-conceived
criteria to determine the likelihood of further abuse. Without the cognitive scripts
necessary to understand the dynamics of domestic violence, judges are likely to
apply scripts that do not apply to domestic violence situations, understand
"emergencies" as one time, rather than cyclical events or apply anger
management scripts where power and control scripts are more appropriate.
We thus argue that in light of the cognitive difficulties judges face when
determining whether future abuse is likely to happen, legislation should be
reformed to create a better heuristic for judges to use, one that is more consistent
with the realities of domestic violence. We describe in detail our proposed
legislative reforms in Section V below.
V.

PROPOSED LAW REFORMS

In this section, we set forth our proposed reforms to the law to address the
deficiencies in the legislation and the judicial decision making we described in
earlier sections of this Article. As noted earlier, in its most basic form, virtually
all order of protection statutes require at least two things for an order of
protection to be granted: that "abuse" (as defined in the state statute) has
occurred, and that further abuse or violence may or will occur (with the vast
majority requiring a "clear and present danger of violence", but some seeming to
only require that abuse has occurred220 ).We thus focus our reform proposal on
these two basic elements of the laws on orders of protection, and then address
related complicated issues, including creating a fair process for respondents. We
do so, keeping in mind what is at stake when petitioners are denied an order of
protection even though they have been abused and are in danger of escalating
violence, and what is at stake for respondents when they are subject to an order
of protection based on false accusations of abuse.
First, because domestic violence is commonly the result of power and
control dynamics, we propose, as others have before us, 221 that the definition of
what types of actions and conduct (i.e. abuse) can serve as the predicate for an
order of protection be broadly defined. The definition of the requisite abuse
should include the multiple forms of coercive abuse that creates dependence on
the abusive intimate partner that characterize domestic violence. This type of
abuse is very harmful to the target of the abuse and it often escalates over time,
especially when the target seeks to separate from the abusive intimate partner. In
Section IV, we reviewed several examples where courts denied an order of
protection where the petitioner was clearly in danger of serious abuse, even of
violence, because the statute's definition of abuse was too narrow. 222
Consequently, we recommend that not only physical violence, sexual assault,

220. See supra notes 22-23.
221. See Stark, supra note 13, at 137.
222. See Ditmars v. Ditmars, 788 N.W.2d 817 (Neb. Ct. App. 2010); Cloeter v.
Cloeter, 770 N.W.2d 660 (Neb. Ct. App. 2009).
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rape, and threats to commit the same should serve as the basis for obtaining an
order of protection, but also a pattern of respondent engaging in various other
forms of abuse that are coercive in nature or a pattern of emotional abuse
calculated to cause dependence on the abusive intimate partner. A good example
of a state with this type of broad definition of "abuse" that can lead to an order
of protection and that takes into account the realities of domestic violence, is
Illinois. 223
As noted earlier, in one jurisdiction it appears that the finding that statutory
abuse has occurred is all that is needed for an ex parte order of protection to be
granted; and in some jurisdictions all that is needed is a finding that further abuse
"could" or "may" occur. 224 This may be the case because of the recognition by
some that if an abusive intimate partner has engaged in abuse in the past, they
are likely to continue to do so in the future. 225 And in light of the problems
detailed earlier with judges trying to determine whether abuse is likely to occur
in the future, we would support legislation that does not require anything further
for the granting of an ex parte order of protection other than a showing of
statutory abuse, since the respondent would have the opportunity to rebut this
(that abuse has in fact occurred or that it is likely to continue) at the contested
hearing that would take place after the respondent is served.
But, we recognize that doing away with inquiry into the second element of
"likelihood of future abuse" may be too dramatic a change for the many
jurisdictions that require a showing of not only statutory abuse, but also a "clear
and present danger of imminent irreparable harm." So, an alternative reform
approach, and the one we recommend, would be for the legislation to provide
that once the requisite level of abuse has been testified to by the petitioner, 226 and
the judge views this testimony as credible,227 a presumption is created that further
abuse by the respondent against the petitioner is likely to occur if the petitioner
testifies either that: (i) she thinks, believes, or fears that future abuse is likely to
occur or (ii) thinks, believes, or fears that if the respondent were given notice that
the petitioner was seeking an order of protection that the respondent would try to
stop her or further abuse her. This testimony by the petitioner is highly predictive,
perhaps more so than any other factor. This is because a petitioner who has been
a target of abuse is the most knowledgeable of the history and pattern of that
abuse and in the best position to know what sets off the abusive intimate partner.
And, for the reasons detailed in Section III and IV, the legislation should make
clear that this presumption at the ex parte stage cannot be overcome due to the
time that has lapsed between the last act of abuse and when the petitioner appears
in court for the ex parte order of protection.

223. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/103(1).
224. See statutes cited supra notes 17-18.
225. Frank v. Hawkins, 891 N.E. 2d 522, 535 (III App 4d 2008) ("The best indicator
of a person's future conduct is his past conduct.").
226. If the petitioner is prose, judges should be required to ask the petitioners if they
have experienced any recent abuse from the respondent or abuse during the course of their
relationship with the respondent. They should also be asked to include all forms of abuse
they experienced, not only physical violence or threat of physical violence.
227. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.

56

WISCONSIN JOURNAL OF LAW, GENDER & SOCIETY

[Vol. 32:1

We are thus proposing two reforms to the pre-conditions for the granting of
ex parte orders of protection in the domestic violence context: (1) that the forms
of statutory "abuse" be expanded as noted above and (2) that a presumption of
the likelihood of further abuse be based upon the past abuse (unless the judge
properly finds that testimony to not be credible) and the testimony from the
petitioner as described above. Once this presumption has been created, the judge
would be required to grant an ex parte order of protection. The respondent would
then have the opportunity to rebut this presumption at the contested hearing after
service of the respondent.
But there are still several thorny and important details to grapple with to
address additional problems with judicial decision making in this area oflaw and
the problem of petitioners who falsely claim abuse. We thus set forth below our
analysis of and proposals for how to deal with these issues.
The first of these thorny issues is whether a judge should be required to
grant an order of protection if the only evidence of the abuse is the petitioner's
testimony and the judge hears testimony that makes the judge doubt the
credibility of the petitioner's story. Unfortunately, as described earlier, when
judges are not adequately trained in the dynamics of domestic violence they
might not find a petitioner's testimony credible due to inappropriate grounds. For
example, portions of the testimony that are inconsistent with the judge's
intuitions but consistent with the counterintuitive aspects of domestic violence
should not be the basis to find a petitioner's testimony not credible. Similarly, to
the extent the testimony or demeanor of the petitioner do not conform with
gendered stereotypes, this should not be the basis to find the petitioner's
testimony not credible. We propose that the order of protection legislation
identify these types of misconceptions about domestic violence and prohibit a
judge from using these misconceptions as the basis to find that the petitioner's
testimony is not credible. 228 We also propose that judges be required to undergo
extensive training in domestic violence, as described below, before they preside
over order of protection cases to reduce the incidences of judges viewing a
petitioner's testimony as not credible due to ignorance of the dynamics of
domestic violence. Due to some judges improperly doubting the credibility of
the stories that survivors of domestic violence tell in their pleadings and in court,
we propose that at the ex parte stage the petitioner's story should be accorded a
presumption of truth. The judge would need to have, and state for the record in
writing their decision, the reasons they are denying the ex parte order of
protection and, if applicable, why they do not find the petitioner's testimony to
be credible that abuse has occurred (which cannot be based on the reasons listed
in the statute as improper reasons) before denying an ex parte order of protection.
On a related issue, we have two specific recommendations to improve the
training on domestic violence that judges should receive so they will be less
228. Examples of misconceptions that should not be permitted to serve as the basis to
find a petitioner credible include: the petitioner engaged in self-defense or failed to engage in
self-defense; the petitioner was impassive on the stand or was angry on the stand; the
petitioner did not seek an order of protection soon after the abuse alleged; and the petitioner
would not state that she feared the respondent. See 750 [LL. COMP. STAT. 60/214(e)(3)(5).
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likely to incorrectly deny an order of protection due to their mistaken intuition
not to believe the petitioner. First, we propose that the training on domestic
violence use the "In Her Shoes" exercise229 to enable judges to better empathize
with the challenges to safely leaving that survivors of domestic violence
experience so that the survivor of the violence does not experience additional
abuse from the judge. 230 We also propose that in addition to the existing
educational programs on domestic violence, a new cognitive test be created for
the judges to take to assess the scripts and schemas judges apply to the domestic
violence cases. It will let them know after they complete the test the extent to
which the judge follows personal biases, stereotypes, and heuristics that are
inconsistent with the realities of domestic violence. We are currently developing
such tests in the second author's laboratory based on the "moving windows"
paradigm. 231 The American Bar Association recently used the Implicit Attitudes
Test with some volunteer judges to identify for them unconscious racial biases
they had and the judges afterwards commented on how helpful this test was and
how they will keep the results in mind (and strategies to overcome these biases)
in their future cases. 232
The second complicated issue is what grounds would serve as the basis for
the respondent to rebut at the contested hearing the presumption of the likelihood
of further abuse, based upon all of the alleged prior abuse. In considering this
question we begin with the assumption that before this issue is addressed the
question of whether statutory abuse has occurred has already been determined
by the preponderance of the evidence. To the extent the respondent attempts to
229. See "In Her Shoes: Living with Domestic Violence," WSCADV Against
Domestic Violence, https://wscadv.myshopify.corn/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2017).
230. For example, in Seminole County, Florida, Judge Jerri L. Collins lacked all
empathy for the victim of the violence by harshly berating a domestic violence victim for
failing to testify against the assailant. The victim was sentenced to three days in jail even
though she apologized and pleaded with the judge not to imprison her because she did not
have childcare provider for her one-year-old child and the victim herself was experiencing
anxiety and depression. See Lesile Salzillo, "Judge who berated and jailed a domestic abuse
victim gets her day in court-and it's not pretty," Daily Kos (Sept. 01, 2016, 6: 12 PM),
http://www.dailykos.corn/story/2016/9/ 1/1565935/-Judge-who-berated-and-jailed-adomestic-abuse-victim-gets-her-day-in-court-and-it-s-not-pretty; See also Rene Stutzman,
"Seminole County judge reprimanded by Florida Supreme Court," Orlando Sentinel (Aug.
30, 2016, 5:36 PM), http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/breaking-news/os-judge-jerricoll ins-scolded-by-florida-supreme-court-20160826-story .html.
231. In the moving windows paradigm, participants see a few words at a time and
press a key to advance to the next few words. Reading a story about domestic violence, we
predict that participants will slow down when described events that are consistent with the
dynamics of domestic violence violate the participants' scripts. See Effects ofLexical
Frequency and Syntactic Complexity in Spoken-language Comprehension: Evidence from
the Auditory Moving-window Technique. 22(2) J. OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY:
LEARNING, MEMORY, AND COGNITION 324-335. See also Just, Carpenter & Woolley,
Paradigms and Processes in Reading Comprehension, 111 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOLOGY: GENERAL 228-238 (1982).
232. See "Judges: 6 strategies to combat implicit bias on the bench," Am. Bar Ass'n
(Sept. 2016), http://www.americanbar.org/publ ications/youraba/2016/september2016/strategies-on-implicit-bias-and-de-biasing-for-judges-and-lawyer.html.
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raise the misconceptions that the statute lays out as inappropriate, the judge
should not place weight on those factors in determining if abuse has occurred.
So on what basis then could a respondent successfully rebut the presumption at
the ex parte stage that the abuse has occurred and is likely to continue? One
possibility would be to first identify the reasons for the prior abuse (for example,
a desire for coercive control, an anger management problem, a substance abuse
problem, or a mental illness problem) and then demonstrate that those reasons
no longer exist (for example through successful completion of a partner abuse
intervention program, an anger management program, a substance abuse
program, or the treatment of the mental illness). Then, the respondent could
present evidence that while the respondent had the opportunity to continue to
engage in abuse after the last act of abuse, the respondent had not done so for a
long period of time (at least one year). Finally, when the prior acts of abuse were
coercive in nature, reflecting a need for power and control over the petitioner,
the respondent must also show that the parties have been living apart for at least
one year. We propose this last requirement, because if the parties have been
living together while no further abuse has occurred it could be because the
petitioner has been engaging in conduct to mollify the respondent to prevent such
further abuse, and once the petitioner ceases to do so, the danger of further abuse
increases. 233
Finally, there is the problem of how to balance the petitioner's need for
safety against the respondent's need for a fair process, including that some
petitioners falsely accuse respondents of committing abuse. The concern that one
or both parties to a civil lawsuit might lie about what happened exists for any
case and is not unique to order of protection cases.
Before considering appropriate safeguards to respondents in the order of
protection context, it is important to first assess the likelihood of false
accusations of abuse taking place and the harm to the respondent when that
happens.
In most circumstances, a petitioner has little to gain from seeking an order
of protection based on false allegations of abuse and a lot to lose. For example,
if the parties are not married and have no children in common, and the petitioner
seeks the basic remedies of: stay away, 234 no further contact, and stop the abuse,
the only thing the petitioner might "gain" from falsely accusing the respondent
is to harm the respondent's reputation. 235 To the contrary, however, survivors of
233. The court should also check for evidence of continuing abuse by the respondent
of others during this period (in a new intimate partner relationship) by checking for order of
protection or criminal charges against the respondent. And if that has occurred, this should
be a strong factor counted against the respondent's claim that future abuse is not likely.
234. If a "stay away order" includes public areas that the respondent has a right to
enter (such as a church both parties attend), then the statute can create a balancing test of the
hardship on each party that takes into account the danger to the petitioner if the remedy is
not granted. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT 60/214(3).
235. False allegation also has a negative impact on their employment and housing if
protection order records are picked up in a standard criminal background check or credit
check. It appears it does not. It can also potentially affect respondent's ability to lawfully
possess a firearm. See the Federal Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(l) (2012), which
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domestic violence often turn to this civil form of protection, in contrast to a
criminal action, because they do not want the abusive intimate partner to be
harmed by a criminal action but still want to be protected from further abuse.
They may fear the respondent's reaction to their pressing criminal charges. They
may still love the respondent but want the respondent to stop harming them. They
may be financially reliant on the respondent and thus not want the respondent to
lose their income while in prison or thereafter due to the imprisonment.
It is still possible, and occasionally happens, that a petitioner might
fabricate the abuse because they are jealous that their former intimate partner has
moved on or otherwise angry with a former intimate partner. But this should be
rare, especially when judges make clear, at the beginning of their court call, of
the possibility of doing jail time for lying on the stand. Having the judge inform
both parties of the laws of perjury and possibility of jail time for lying is a
practice we recommend be required in the order of protection legislation. 236
In states that allow more expansive remedies, 237 a person may have an
incentive to lie that abuse has occurred, or to exaggerate the extent of the abuse,
to take advantage of the favorable position they might have if the court finds that
abuse has occurred. 238 Having said that, if there is insufficient evidence of the
makes it a felony for respondents under certain protective orders to possess or receive any
firearm shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. There is an exemption
under this statute for law enforcement officers for weapons carried on duty. So the only
"gain" to the petitioner in those circumstances is causing harm to the respondent. In addition,
there must have been a hearing that the respondent had an opportunity to participate in and a
finding that the respondent represents a credible threat to the physical safety of the intimate
partner or child.
236. Two studies have examined rates of substantiated allegations of domestic
violence in the context of family law proceedings, and they find that allegations are
substantiated in 63-74% of cases. Martha Shafer & Nicholas Bala, Wife Abuse, Child
Custody and Access in Canada, IN THE EFFECTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE ON
CHILDREN 253, 259 (Robert A. Geffner, Robyn Spurling lngelman, & Jennifer Zellner eds.,
2003); and Janet R. Johnston et al., Allegations and Substantiations ofAbuse in CustodyDisputing Families, 43 FAMILY COURT REVIEW 283,290 (2005). The remainder were not
substantiated based on insufficient information or where there is a determination that the
allegation is false.
237. For example, the remedy of exclusive possession of (but not title to) the shared
residence or remedies relating to children such as temporary physical custody, sole power to
make major decisions relating to the children, or imposing restrictions on the respondent's
parenting time, or financial remedies such as payment of child support or spousal
maintenance. All of these and additional remedies are available under the IDVA 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/214(b) and by some other state statutes.
238. For example, under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act
("IMDMA") abuse of a parent is a factor in determining the best interest of the child on how
to allocate parental rights on decision making and parenting time. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/602.5(c)(l3) and 5/602.7(b)(l4) (West 2016). Under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act,
however, if one parent has been abusive to the other parent it creates a rebuttable
presumption that it is in the best interest of the child to be in the physical care of the nonabusive parent. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214(b)(5 - 6). In addition, under the IMDMA ifa
parent seeks restrictions on the parenting time of the non-custodial parent, the custodial
parent must show serious endangerment of the child from non-restricted parenting time. 750
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/602.8(a) (West 2016). However, under the IDVA, there is not a
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abuse, once the case is transferred to the divorce or parentage court, false
allegations of abuse (to obtain exclusive possession of the home or favorable
temporary custody/visitation) will likely backfire, and the court may view the
petitioner who lacks corroborating evidence of the abuse alleged, as an
"alienating" parent. If the court finds that the petitioner has failed to foster a good
relationship between the child and the other parent, the court is likely to not only
override the order of protection relating to those remedies, but may also impose
restrictions on the petitioner's parenting time! 239 Due to this, a petitioner would
be making a very big mistake in fabricating abuse to gain a temporary advantage
on these issues. Some father's rights groups have claimed that under broad based
definitions of abuse (i.e. when abuse includes more than physical abuse and
threats of physical abuse), if a respondent shouts at his spouse he will lose his
house. But this claim of unfairness is inaccurate 240 and dismissive of the various
forms of abuse, including emotional, that are very harmful and dangerous due to
the danger of escalation of violence and separation assault. The claim that
petitioners lie about abuse in an order of protection to gain financial leverage in
the divorce or parentage case is belied by the fact that, if the parties have children
in common, seeking temporary child support (if a remedy under the order of
protection241 ) would not go beyond what petitioners would be entitled to under
laws relevant to that. Furthermore, the temporary order for support, if beyond
what the law would require in the divorce or parentage case, could also be later
modified in the divorce or parentage case.
In light of the foregoing, including the fact that petitioners have little to gain
from making false accusations but much to lose (going to prison for perjury), we
believe that the vast majority of petitioners seeking orders of protection are

requirement of substantial endangerment of the child to restrict the non-custodial parent's
parenting time and restriction can be based on among other things when the respondent uses
visitation as an opportunity to abuse or harass the petitioner or petitioner's family or
household members. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214(b)(7).
239. For example, under the IDVA, one of the factors in determining the best interests
of the child in determining parental decision making and parenting time is "the willingness
and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship
between the other parent and the child." 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602.5 (c)(l 1), 602.7(b)(l3).
If judges feel that a parent is alleging abuse falsely, they will likely see that parent as an
alienating parent and if they consider the alienation to be strong they may determine that
unsupervised parenting time could substantially endanger the child.
240. This claim is inaccurate. First, simply shouting at your spouse would not satisfy
the conduct for what is "abuse" under the IDVA. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/103(1).
Second, even if among the other forms of serious abuse in a specific case, there are
additional preconditions to obtaining the remedy of exclusive possession of the residence,
including that the court first balance the hardship to the respondent in losing possession of
the residence to the hardship to the petitioner in moving to become safe and a showing of an
immediate danger of further abuse. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60I/214(b)(2)(B). And, ownership
rights to the dwelling are not affected by the remedy, with who takes title to the dwelling to
be determined by the court in the divorce case and the possibility of who ends up in
possession of the home being modified by the divorce court.
241. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214(b)(12) referring to the Illinois Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act for how to calculate child support.
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truthfully in need of an order of protection to prevent further abuse. This belief
is supported by empirical evidence. 242 Having said that, there will be occasional
situations where petitioners fabricate or exaggerate the abuse they allege,
consequently safeguards should be in place to address this. 243
In addition to the possibility of jail time for perjury, there are two additional
safeguards we recommend be available to respondents when they have been
proven to have been falsely accused of statutory abuse. First, the order of
protection statute should include civil liability for the respondent's reasonable
attorney's fees and court costs if the petitioner is proven to have provided
material, false statements of abuse in their pleadings or court testimony, knowing
the statements were not true. 244 Second, procedures should be in place to expunge
or seal the public record of the petition and the ex parte order of protection, if the
respondent provides evidence at the contested hearing that the allegations of
abuse were false and that statutory abuse did not occur. 245
Related to the possibility that the petitioner may file false allegations of
abuse is the situation that a person who is in fact the abusive intimate partner,
might race to court seeking an order of protection against the target of the abuse.
They may do so as a further means of abuse or to try to make it difficult for the
target of the abuse to obtain an order of protection. For this reason, we also
propose that before a judge rules on any ex parte order of protection case, the
clerk of the court be required to perform a computer search for any prior orders
of protection or criminal charges relating to domestic violence, against the
petitioner or respondent. If those searches show that the petitioner has been
convicted of or charged with a domestic violence related charge in the past or
has had an order of protection granted against the petitioner, this could be the
basis for the judge to find the petitioner not credible and to deny the order of
protection sought.
The order of protection statutes should also provide the respondent with the
opportunity to rebut the claims of abuse, or of the likelihood of further abuse, as
242. See comments supra, note 179. But see, The Use and Abuse of Domestic
Restraining Orders, Stop Abusive and Violent Environments (Feb. 2011),
http://www.saveservices.org/downloadsN A WA-Restraining-Orders, which alleged higher
percentages of "unsubstantiated" claims of abuse, but their calculation included not only
cases of false allegations but also cases where the petitioner did not allege any physical
violence, viewing the other forms of abuse alleged as the equivalent of making a
"groundless" allegation of abuse.
243. Id.
244. See, 750 ILL COMP. STAT 60/226 which provides that allegations and denials
made without reasonable cause and found to be untrue subjects the party pleading them to
payment ofreasonable expenses incurred thereby including reasonable attorney's fees.
245. This would be in contrast with the situation where the case was dismissed when
the petitioner fails to appear on the return date since petitioners in abusive relationships are
likely to receive threats if they do not drop the case and when that happens the respondent
should not be rewarded with a complete clearing of the record and instead the record should
simply state that the case was dropped. A petitioner also sometimes drops a case when they
think obtaining the ex parte order was enough to stop the abuse or when they have difficulty
returning to court, especially if they have to keep returning to court as they wait for the
respondent to be served.
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soon as possible after the respondent has been served, as a means to mitigate the
harm from a false accusation. In Illinois, for example, the order of protection
statute provides for the return date to take place three weeks after the ex parte
order is granted, but with opportunity for the respondent to seek a hearing upon
just two days notice to the petitioner. 246
Another aspect to the fairness of the order of protection laws towards
respondents relates to how long the order of protection (granted after the
respondent is served) is initially effective, when it can be renewed, and when it
will terminate. An entire article could be devoted to this topic. For our purposes,
in this Article, we note that orders of protection after a contested hearing rarely
run indefinitely, but are limited to a set period such as one year, and are
renewable upon a showing that there is still a risk of further abuse. We believe,
that after a long period of non-abuse has occurred (even when the respondent had
the opportunity for such abuse) and the respondent has addressed the underlying
causes for the prior pattern of abuse or physical violence as described earlier, the
order of protection, and the record of the order of protection could be sealed and
not available as a public record. If further abuse then occurs, the record would
be re-opened.
One final issue to address is the argument that since orders of protection are
merely a piece of paper and cannot stop a bullet, they are of little value in helping
protect survivors of domestic violence from further abuse. If this is correct, then
it might suggest that the harms from false accusations outweigh the benefits to
survivors of domestic violence from obtaining the orders of protection. While it
is true that an order of protection is a piece of paper that cannot stop a bullet; it
is still more than just a piece of paper. For example, if an order of protection
includes an order to stay away from a specific location (such as the place where
the petitioner works) then once the respondent has been served with the order, if
thereafter the respondent sets foot in the place of employment, the police can be
immediately called and the respondent charged with the crime of violation of the
stay away order. 247 This is a valuable order because without it, the respondent
would need to engage in actual violence or other crimes for the police to be called
and the respondent arrested. If the petitioner sees the respondent anywhere near
her, she can call the police for help and have the respondent arrested for violating
the stay away order before violence has occurred. 248 While orders of protection
do not guarantee safety to a petitioner, they are a valuable protection, when
combined with other safety steps, in many cases. 249 And for respondents who
have a good job, or other reasons to try to avoid going to jail, once they are made
aware of the order of protection and the consequences for violating it, they will
have a strong incentive to comply with the order.

246. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/224(d).
247. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/223(a)(l). To the extent any other jurisdictions do
not have similar legislation, then they should enact such legislation.
248. ld.
249. If the respondent has a long history of convictions for crimes and time in jail,
would unlikely be deterred by the order of protection, and would be enraged by it, then
obtaining an order of protection would likely not be the best route for the petitioner, who
might need to go into hiding and move to a new state.
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CONCLUSION

The dynamics of domestic violence are counterintuitive and do not follow
the same patterns as other domains where petitioners seek ex parte emergency
orders. Thus, judges sometimes fail to see that further abuse and an escalation of
violence is likely to occur, (i.e. "see the wrecking ball in motion") when
petitioners appear before them for ex parte orders of protection from domestic
violence. Many state statutes fail to take into consideration the dynamics of
domestic violence, and consequently, as illustrated in this Article, fail to
adequately protect survivors of domestic violence from further abuse or an
escalation of violence. But even in states with statutes that succeed in considering
some of the counterintuitive dynamics of domestic violence, we found that
judges have nevertheless interpreted the statutory language in ways that are more
intuitive to judges based on their personal experiences, stereotypes, and biases,
thereby again sometimes missing the wrecking ball in motion.
In this Article, we provided numerous examples where judges have required
that the petitioner seek the order of protection very soon after the most recent,
serious, act of abuse, even when this is not required in the legislation. We
hypothesized that judges do this as an intuitive heuristic to determine the
likelihood of further abuse, even though we noted the many reasons why a
survivor of domestic violence might be unable to take swift action to obtain an
order of protection after severe abuse. We also found cases where a judge denied
an order of protection because the petitioner did not express that she "feared" the
respondent or that she "feared" (versus "believed" or "thought") that without the
order of protection, further abuse would occur. This was the case even though
some survivors of domestic violence do not feel, or are reluctant to express, the
emotion of fear, notwithstanding that the danger of further abuse existed and
should have been apparent to the judge. As noted in the Article, judges
sometimes require that the petitioner express "fear" even when this is not in the
statutory language. We believe, this is occurring due to judges' gendered
stereotypes, and, as a heuristic to determine if there is a "clear and present
danger" of future violence.
Another key point raised is that it is very difficult to determine the
likelihood of further abuse with the precision that many statutes seem to require.
And judges lack the time and expertise to perform a thorough, multi-factor
assessment of the likelihood of continued abuse at the ex parte hearing stage.
Like all people, judges rely upon decision-making shortcuts such as heuristics
and simple reason-based decision criteria when they are faced with such difficult
judgments, but when they fail to understand the dynamics of domestic violence
the criteria they use in these shortcuts are inappropriate.
We thus propose legislation that lays out easier to apply criteria for whether
ex parte orders of protection should be granted in domestic violence situations
that take into account the counter-intuitive realities of domestic violence. We
propose a two-step decision-making process for the initial ex parte order of
protection that we believe will enable judges to overcome the cognitive barriers
noted earlier and enable them to better protect survivors of domestic violence
from future, escalating abuse. We also propose numerous safeguards to
respondents, some of which are designed to deter petitioners from making false
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allegations in the first place, and other safeguards that would come into play after
a respondent has been falsely accused of domestic violence or after the
respondent has made changes in attitudes and behavior so that further abuse is
no longer likely. We further recommend domestic violence training that enables
judges to better understand and empathize with survivors of domestic violence.
We also recommend the development of a "sliding windows" paradigm test for
judges to use to determine the extent to which they are biased against domestic
violence realities in their decisions as part of the training to overcome such
biases.
While it is inevitable that judges will sometimes get it wrong (granting an
order of protection when abuse has not occurred or will not re-occur; or denying
an order of protection when abuse has occurred and will occur again), we believe
that the reforms we propose better balance what is at stake for the petitioner and
the respondent from a wrong decision and make it more likely that judges will
make the right decision.

